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Ensuring a Right of Access to the Courts for Bias
Crime Victims:
A Section 5 Defense of the Matthew Shepard Act
Jordan Blair Woods*
Congress recently invoked its power under the Commerce Clause to
pass the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007 (The
Matthew Shepard Act). On December 6, 2007, Congressional Democrats
dropped the Matthew Shepard Act from the U.S. Department of Defense
authorization bill. With Democrats now in control of Congress and the
election of President Barack Obama, there is renewed hope that the
Matthew Shepard Act will be passed and enacted during a subsequent
session.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the authority
to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment through
federal legislation. Although Congress invoked its commerce power to
pass the Matthew Shepard Act, it did not invoke its enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article provides the
first comprehensive defense of the Matthew Shepard Act under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. I contend that Congress has the authority to
adopt the Matthew Shepard Act by invoking its Section 5 enforcement
power and that Section 5 is a stronger constitutional basis to adopt the Act
than the Commerce Clause.
In Tennessee v. Lane, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Congress’
authority to invoke its Section 5 enforcement power in order to ensure that
individuals with disabilities have equal access to the courts. Similarly, I
argue that the Matthew Shepard Act is a valid enactment of Congress’
Section 5 enforcement power in order to ensure a right of access to the
courts for bias crime victims targeted because of sexual orientation, gender
identity, gender, and disability. I contend that discrimination and resource
constraints prevent these groups of bias crime victims from reporting their
crimes to the police, influence police officers not to categorize or
investigate their crimes as bias crimes, and prevent prosecutors from
prosecuting their crimes as bias crimes. The Matthew Shepard Act is a
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critical piece of legislation because it provides a federal remedy when state
and local laws exclude or inadequately address bias crimes on the basis of
sexual orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability. The Matthew
Shepard Act also allocates federal resources to ensure that resource
constraints will not prevent state and local governments from investigating
and prosecuting bias crimes.
INTRODUCTION
Despite numerous unsuccessful attempts to expand federal bias crime
legislation,1 Congress recently invoked its power under the Commerce
Clause2 to pass the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of
2007 (The Matthew Shepard Act).3 The Matthew Shepard Act expands the
definition of federal bias crimes to include actual and perceived sexual
orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability as protected
characteristics.4 Under certain conditions, the Act also provides federal
assistance to state and local authorities in investigating and prosecuting
bias crimes even if the victims were not engaged in federally protected
activities when the crimes occurred.5
On December 6, 2007, Congressional Democrats dropped the
Matthew Shepard Act from the U.S. Department of Defense authorization
bill.6 Proponents of the Act described the decision as a “major
disappointment to Congressional advocates of the bias crimes expansion
and to civil rights activists who believed that the new Democrat-led
Congress provided the best opportunity for approving changes sought since
1998.”7 Immediately after the Matthew Shepard Act was dropped from the

1 A summary of the unsuccessful attempts to expand federal bias crime legislation is provided
infra Part I.D.
2 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8,   cl.   3   (“Congress   shall   have   power . . . to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”).
3 H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 14 (2007).
4 The Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. § 6
(2007) (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)); Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 7 (2007) (same).
5 H.R. 1592 at § 6 (proposing changes to § 249(b)); S. 1105 at § 7 (same). Currently, federal
bias crime legislation only allows the federal government to become involved in the investigation and
prosecution of bias crimes if the victims were engaged in certain federally protected activities when the
crimes were committed. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000). These federally protected activities are: (1) applying
or enrolling for admission to a public school or college; (2) participating in benefit or service programs
and facilities administered by state and local governments; (3) applying for private or state
employment; (4) serving in a jury; (5) traveling in or using a facility of interstate commerce or common
carrier; and (6) using a public accommodation or place of exhibition or entertainment, including hotels,
motels, restaurants, lunchrooms, bars, gas stations, theaters, concert halls, sports arenas, or stadiums.
Id.
6 Carl Hulse, Congressional Maneuvering Dooms Hate Crime Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2007, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/07/washington/07hate.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2008). After the Senate passed the Matthew Shepard Act, it went to conference where the U.S.
House of Representatives and U.S. Senate versions of the bill needed to be harmonized for a final vote.
See id.
7 Id.
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defense authorization legislation, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi affirmed
publicly that she was “strongly committed” to the Act.8 With Democrats
now in control of Congress and the election of President Barack Obama,
there is renewed hope that the Matthew Shepard Act will be passed and
enacted during the next four years.9
In criticizing the Matthew Shepard Act, scholars and politicians have
argued that the Act is an improper exercise of Congress’ commerce power
after United States v. Morrison.10 In Morrison, the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated a provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)11
which provided a federal civil remedy to victims of gender-motivated
violence.12 To justify enacting VAWA, Congress invoked its powers under
the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 The
Morrison Court held that VAWA’s civil remedy was an improper exercise
of both Congress’ commerce and Section 5 enforcement powers.14
Since the Matthew Shepard Act contains a provision providing for the
federal punishment of bias crimes motivated by gender, it is unclear
8 Measure Aimed at Crimes Against Gays Dropped, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at A30, available
at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/07/nation/na-hatecrimes7.
9 President Barack Obama was an original cosponsor of the Matthew Shepard Act and is an avid
supporter of federal bias crime legislation. While he was a Senator for the state of Illinois, Obama
released a public statement criticizing Congress’ decision to drop the Act from the defense
authorization bill. See Obama Statement on House-Senate Failure to Strengthen Hate Crimes Laws,
Guarantee Equality, Dec. 6, 2007, http://web.archive.org/web/20080109103124/obama.senate.gov/
press/071206-obama_statement_106/print.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2009).
10 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see John S. Baker, United States v. Morrison and Other Arguments
Against   Federal   “Hate   Crime”   Legislation, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1191, 1217–19 (2000); Christopher
Chorba, The Danger of Federalizing Hate Crimes: Congressional Misconceptions and the Unintended
Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 319, 355–56 (2001); Alexander
Dombrowsky, Comment, Whether the Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act Will
Further Federal Protection from Sexual Orientation Crimes, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587, 588 (2000); Dan
Hasenstab, Comment, Is Hate A Form of Commerce? The Questionable Constitutionality of Federal
“Hate  Crime”  Legislation, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973, 1016 (2001); Anthony E. Varona & Kevin Layton,
Anchoring Justice: The Constitutionality of the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act in United
States  v.  Morrison’s  Shifting  Seas, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 9 (2001). Before Morrison, scholars also
criticized previous attempts to expand federal bias crime legislation to include sexual orientation,
gender, and disability as an improper exercise of Congress’ commerce power. See, e.g., Combating
Hate Crimes: Promoting a Responsive and Responsible Role for the Federal Government: Hearing on
S. 622 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 49 (1999) (statement of Akhil Reed
Amar); see also Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998, Testimony on H.R. 3081 Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of John C. Harrison).
11 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613–15 (invalidating 42 U.S.C. § 13981). Section 13981 provided:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and
thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to
the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages,
injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief, and such other relief as a court may
deep appropriate.
12 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02.
13 Id. at 607. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce,
through legislation, the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment   reads:   “The   Congress   shall   have   the   power   to   enforce,   by   appropriate
legislation,  the  provisions  of  this  article.”    U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
14 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
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whether the Act can be sustained as a valid exercise of Congress’
commerce and Section 5 enforcement powers after Morrison.15 This
uncertainty is further complicated by the fact that Congress invoked its
Section 5 enforcement power to adopt VAWA,16 but only invoked its
commerce power to adopt the Matthew Shepard Act.17
This Article provides the first comprehensive defense of the Matthew
Shepard Act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. By
distinguishing the Matthew Shepard Act from VAWA, I not only argue that
Congress has the authority to adopt the Act by invoking its Section 5
enforcement power, but I also argue that Section 5 is a stronger
constitutional basis to adopt the Act than the Commerce Clause.18
Therefore, when reconsidering the Act in subsequent sessions, Congress
should specifically invoke its Section 5 enforcement power.
Advocating a Section 5 defense of the Matthew Shepard Act may
seem peculiar in light of the Supreme Court’s recent restrictive Section 5
jurisprudential approach.19 During the 1960s, the Court granted Congress
increasing deference to pass laws by invoking its Section 5 enforcement
power.20 This approach lasted until 1997, when the Court in City of Boerne
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619–27 (discussing Congress’ reliance upon Section 5 enforcement
power  to  adopt  VAWA’s  federal  civil  remedy  and  the history of the Section 5 enforcement power).
17 See supra note 3.
18 I contend that Morrison changes the relative strengths of these two justifications, and after
Morrison Section 5 is a stronger constitutional justification for the expansion of federal bias crime
legislation than the Commerce Clause. When legislation to expand federal bias crime laws was first
introduced during the 1990s, some scholars, including Cass R. Sunstein, identified the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as permissible grounds to enact such legislation,
but argued that the Commerce Clause was the stronger of the two foundations. See, e.g., Combating
Hate Crimes: Promoting a Responsive and Responsible Role for the Federal Government: Hearing on
S. 622 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 106 (1998) (statement of Cass Sunstein).
Sunstein gave his testimony on this issue to the Committee on the Judiciary prior to the Supreme
Court’s  decision  in  Morrison. According to Sunstein:
The first—and most secure—possibility is that the commerce clause could be used, with
appropriate findings, to support this assertion of national power. It is obvious that private
violence may well interfere with interstate movement of both people and goods. The
current findings are quite good in this regard.
Id.
19 Some scholars believe   that   the   Court’s   recent   Section   5   approach   warrants criticism. This
Article does not provide such critique. Rather, I accept this approach for descriptive purposes and
attempt to develop progressive constitutional arguments within a framework that seems resistant to
them. For a few critiques of the Court’s  recent  Section  5  approach  see  David  Cole,  The Value of Seeing
Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP.
CT. REV. 31; Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
743 (1998); Michael A. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegal, Protecting the Constitution
from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003).
20 William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal Protection,
79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 520–21 (2005)  (“Nearly  forty  years  ago,  the  seminal  cases  of  South  Carolina  v.  
Katzenbach and Katzenbach v. Morgan granted Congress broad authority to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments . . . .”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1945
(2003).
15
16
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v. Flores21 cut back this vast deference.22 After City of Boerne, the Court
has struck down Section 5 legislation in four cases, illustrating that City of
Boerne ushered a new era of Section 5 jurisprudence.23
Even though this current climate is hostile to Section 5 legislation,
Tennessee v. Lane24 affirmed Congress’ authority to invoke its Section 5
enforcement power to enact Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)—ensuring equal access to the courts for individuals with
disabilities.25 Based on this legitimate goal of ensuring equal access to the
judiciary, I argue that the Matthew Shepard Act is a valid enactment of
Congress’ Section 5 power. I contend that discrimination and resource
constraints in the U.S. law enforcement and judicial systems prevent bias
crime victims targeted because of sexual orientation, gender identity,
gender, and disability from having equal access to the courts. More
specifically, these factors influence bias crime victims not to report bias
crimes to the police, cause police officers not to categorize or to investigate
their crimes as bias crimes, and prevent prosecutors from prosecuting their
crimes as bias crimes. The Matthew Shepard Act is a critical piece of
legislation because it provides a federal remedy when state and local laws
exclude or inadequately address bias crimes on the basis of sexual
orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability. The Act also allocates
federal resources to ensure that resource constraints will not prevent state
and local governments from investigating and prosecuting bias crimes.
Part I provides background on existing federal and state bias crime
laws and unsuccessful attempts to expand federal bias crime law
protections. Part II summarizes the pertinent provisions and congressional
findings of the Matthew Shepard Act. Part III explains why the Matthew
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See William D. Araiza, ENDA before it Starts: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Availability of Damages Awards to Gay State Employees Under the Proposed Employment NonDiscrimination Act, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1,  11  (2002)  (“Starting  with  City of Boerne, the Court
began to cut back on the deference it had  previously  given  to  Congress’ decisions to use its Section 5
power.”);;  Araiza,  supra note 20,  at  521  (“More  recently,  since  1997,  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  
has made cutbacks on Congress’ power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, an important
part of its states-rights agenda, striking down parts of four statutes as exceeding Section   5’s   grant   of  
authority  to  Congress.”). As stated by Post & Siegal:
The Rehnquist Court has increasingly come to regard Section 5 legislation as challenging
the  Court’s  ultimate  authority  to  interpret  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.    In  a  series  of  cases  
that began with City of Boerne v. Flores in 1997 . . . the Court has imposed ever more
restrictive conditions on Congress’ ability to exercise its Section 5 power.
Post & Siegal, supra note 19, at 2.
23 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); and
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
24 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
25 See id. at 533–34. It is important to note that some scholars interpret Tennessee v. Lane and
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), another case in which the
Court upheld Congress’ ability to invoke its Section 5 enforcement   power,   as   a   “loosening   of   the  
stringent review the Court had previously   applied   to   Section   5   legislation.”      William   D.   Araiza,   The
Section 5 Power After Tennessee v. Lane, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 39, 83–84 (2004).
21
22
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Shepard Act is susceptible to attack as an invalid exercise of Congress’
commerce power after Morrison. I do not dispute that arguments exist for
sustaining the Matthew Shepard Act under the Commerce Clause,26 nor do
I argue that Congress’ reliance upon its commerce power to enact the Act is
normatively wrong. Rather, my argument is predominately descriptive and
demonstrates why this reliance is potentially suspect under the Court’s
current jurisprudence. Consequently, Congress should refrain from relying
exclusively upon its commerce power to enact the Matthew Shepard Act.
Part IV shifts the discussion to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This Part provides my own interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s current Section 5 jurisprudential approach and provides a synthesis
explaining the current requirements that Congress must meet to enact
legislation through its Section 5 enforcement power. Part V applies this
synthesis to defend the Matthew Shepard Act as a valid exercise of
Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power. Consequently, I propose that to
strengthen constitutional support for Matthew Shepard Act, Congress
should invoke its Section 5 enforcement power when it reintroduces the bill
in a subsequent session.
I. BACKGROUND ON BIAS CRIME LAW
For contextual purposes, this Part provides an overview of existing
bias crime law in the United States. Part I.A discusses 18 U.S.C. section
245, the first piece of federal bias crime legislation passed in 1968. Part
I.B provides background on more recent federal bias crime legislation that
was proposed and enacted during the 1990s. Part I.C provides an overview
of existing state bias crime laws and their inadequacies. Part I.D discusses
the unsuccessful attempts to expand federal bias crime law prior to the
Matthew Shepard Act.
A.

Early Federal Bias Crime Laws

It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that legislation
was created to specifically address the problem of bias crimes. In 1968,
Congress passed 18 U.S.C. section 245, the first piece of federal bias crime
legislation.27 This statute grants federal officers the authority to investigate
and to prosecute crimes motivated by race, religion, color, and national
origin—four characteristics commonly targeted by white supremacist
organizations, such as the Ku Klux Klan.28 Section 245 also permits the
federal government to investigate and to prosecute bias crimes if the
victims were engaged in certain federally protected activities when the
26 In fact, I have put forth one possible argument in Jordan Blair Woods, Reconceptualizing AntiLGBT Hate Crimes as Burdening Expression and Association: A Case for Expanding Federal Hate
Crime Legislation to Include Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation, 6 J. HATE STUDIES 81, 97–101
(2008).
27 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000).
28 Id. § 245(b).
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crimes occurred. These activities include using public accommodations,
traveling across state lines, and applying for employment.29
Widespread violence aimed at preventing racial and ethnic minorities
from exercising their civil rights prompted Congress to enact Section 245.30
The legislative history indicates that racially-motivated violence had often
gone unpunished and deterred American citizens from freely exercising
their constitutional and statutory rights.31 In explaining the need for the
bill, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary posited that many local and
state law enforcement agencies were unable or simply unwilling to address
violence intended to prevent racial minorities from exercising their civil
rights.32 The Committee also explained that it was the obligation of the
federal government to address criminal acts that burdened affirmative
federal rights.33
B.

Federal Bias Crime Laws Enacted After 18 U.S.C. section 245

The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 199034 (HCSA) was the first piece of
federal bias crime legislation enacted after 18 U.S.C. section 245. HCSA
mandates the Attorney General to gather data about bias crimes on the
basis of race, religion, sexual orientation, and religion.35 The bill also
requires the Attorney General to “establish guidelines for the collection of

29

245.

Id. See supra note 5 for a list of the federally protected activities included under 18 U.S.C. §

30 18 U.S.C. § 245 emerged from three waves of hate-motivated violence that served to prevent
racial and ethnic minorities from exercising their constitutional and federal statutory rights during the
Reconstruction Era, World War I, and the 1960s Civil Rights Movement respectively. During the
Reconstruction Era, many local law enforcement agencies in the South refused to prosecute whites who
committed crimes against African Americans. JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES:
CRIMINAL LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS 36 (1998). Many local law enforcement and government
officials also directly inhibited newly freed slaves from exercising their constitutional rights under the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. An immigration surge during World War I
inspired a second wave of hate-motivated violence. Richard T. Schaefer, The Ku Klux Klan: Continuity
and Change, 32 PHYLON 143, 147–49 (1971). White supremacist organizations not only targeted
African Americans, but also violently attacked Catholics, Jews, and new immigrants. Brian Levin, The
Vindication of Hate Violence Victims Via Criminal and Civil Adjudications, 1 J. HATE STUD. 133, 142
(2002). The 1960s Civil Rights Movement inspired a third wave of racial and ethnic violence. Many
demonstrators were subjected to violence for openly advocating equal civil rights. Id. at  143  (“With  the  
advent of the Civil Rights Era in the 1950s and 1960s white supremacists increasingly turned to
violence to prevent blacks from exercising the newly protected rights granted to them by the Courts and
the legislatures.”).
31 S. REP. NO. 90-721, 3–4 (1967).
32 Id. at 4.
33 Id. at 4–5   (“Federal   legislation   against   racial   violence   is   not   required   solely   because   of   the  
sometimes inadequate workings of State or local criminal processes. Too often in recent years, racial
violence has been used to deny affirmative Federal rights; this action reflects a purpose to flout the
clearly expressed will of the Congress . . . Such lawless acts are distinctly Federal crimes and it is,
therefore, appropriate that responsibility for vindication of the rights infringed should be committed to
the  Federal  courts.”).
34 Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
534 (2000)). Congress reauthorized HCSA in 1996. Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-155, § 7, 110 Stat. 1392, 1394 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 534).
35 Hate Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990).
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such data including the necessary evidence and criteria . . . for a finding of
manifest prejudice.”36 Since its enactment, the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) has gathered and published bias crime statistics every
year since 1992.37 Although scholars embrace Congress’ intentions for
passing HCSA, some have highlighted the need for more sophisticated and
comprehensive bias crime statistical gathering methods than those required
by HSCA.38
In 1994, Congress also enacted the Hate Crimes Sentencing
Enhancement Act39 (HCSEA). HCSEA requires the United States
Sentencing Commission to increase the penalties for crimes committed on
the basis of actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin,
ethnicity, gender, disability or sexual orientation.40 HCSEA only applies to
cases tried in federal courts where federal jurisdiction is proper.41 This
jurisdictional requirement has raised difficulties because 18 U.S.C. section
245 only encompasses groups targeted on the basis of race, religion, color,
and national origin; it does not grant jurisdiction for the federal government
to prosecute crimes motivated by a victim’s sexual orientation, gender
identity, gender, or disability.42 Therefore, HCSEA has not been applied
meaningfully to bias crime victims targeted on the basis of these
characteristics.
C.

Enacted State Bias Crime Legislation

In the 1980s, state legislatures responded to bias-motivated violence
by enacting penalty-enhancement statutes, which increase the punishment
of criminal offenses if they are motivated by bias.43 California was the first

Id.
The  FBI’s  bias  crime  statistics  reports  from  1995  to  2007  are  available   online. See FBI.gov Civil Rights - Hate Crime, Hate Crime Statistics, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/civilrights/hate.htm.
38 Jeanine C. Cogan, Hate Crime as a Crime Category Worthy of Policy Attention, 46 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 173, 174 (2002):
Although this law was highly important in that it helped recognize hate crimes as a
phenomenon that needs federal attention, to date, it has been imperfect in providing
meaningful data. This is partly because police agencies were not required to report hate
crime data for their jurisdictions but rather did so voluntarily. As a result, many police
departments did not offer any hate crime data for the first few years.
For another critical analysis of bias crime statistical methods and findings by the FBI see William B.
Rubenstein, The Real Story of U.S. Hate Crimes Statistics: An Empirical Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV.
1213 (2004).
39 Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1994 of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003, 108 Stat. 1796, 2096 (1994). In 1995, the
United States Sentencing Commission enacted a three-level sentencing guideline for hate crimes. See
28 U.S.C. § 994 (2000).
40 Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1994 of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2096 (1994).
41 Andrew M. Gilbert & Eric D. Marchand, Splitting the Atom or Splitting Hairs—The Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 931, 958 (1999).
42 Id. (noting that this limitation forces prosecutors to obtain federal jurisdiction in other
manners); id. at 978–79.
43 JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 30, at 42. Characteristics included in bias crime penalty36
37
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state to criminalize bias-motivated intimidation and violence.44 Besides
enhancing the punishment for bias crimes, many state laws also allocate
resources to collect bias crime data and to train law enforcement personnel
to properly handle bias-motivated violence.45 Today, nearly every state has
a bias crime law that either enhances the punishment for bias crimes or
allocates resources to gather and release bias crime statistics.46
As of April 2008, eleven states and the District of Columbia include
both sexual orientation and gender identity in their bias crime laws.47
Twenty states include only sexual orientation in their bias crime laws.48 Of
the states that have bias crime laws, fourteen states do not include either
sexual orientation or gender identity as protected characteristics.49 Twentysix states and the District of Columbia include gender in their bias crime
laws.50 Thirty states and the District of Columbia include disability.51
enhancement statutes vary among states and localities. For a comprehensive list of characteristics
included in state statutes, see Anti-Defamation League, State Hate Crimes Statutory Provisions,
http://www.adl.org/learn/hate_crimes_laws/map_frameset.html. See also Cogan, supra note 38, at 174
(describing how hate crimes became institutionalized as a legal category during the 1980s). It is also
important  to  note  that  states  do  not  agree  on  the  meaning  of  “bias”  for  when  applying  bias crime penalty
enhancements. While some states require bias crimes to be motivated by actual group animus, other
states only require that perpetrators intentionally select their victims on the basis of particular protected
characteristics, regardless of whether this intentional selection was motivated by group animus. For an
overview of the different models of bias crime legislation see generally, Jordan Blair Woods, Comment,
Taking   the   “Hate”   Out   of   Hate   Crimes:   Applying   Unfair   Advantage   Theory   to   Justify the Enhanced
Punishment of Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 489, 495–501 (2008).
44 Cogan, supra note 38, at 173.
45 Id. at 176; see also Anti-Defamation League, State Hate Crime Statutory Provisions,
http://www.adl.org/learn/hate_crimes_laws/map_frameset.html, for a current list of states that allocate
resources for data collection and training for law enforcement personnel.
46 See PartnersAgainstHate.org, Hate Crime Laws Around the Country, http://www.
partnersagainsthate.org/hate_response_database/laws.html.
47 The states that include sexual orientation and gender identity in their bias crime laws are
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Oregon, and Vermont.      Nat’l   Gay   and   Lesbian   Task   Force,   Hate   Crime   Laws   Map, http://www.
thetaskforce.org/reports_and_research/hate_crimes_laws.
48 The states that include only sexual orientation in their bias crime laws are Arizona, Delaware,
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin. Id.
Indiana and Michigan’s bias crime data collection laws include sexual orientation, but their bias crime
penalty-enhancement statutes do not. Id.
49 The states that have bias crime laws that exclude either sexual orientation or gender identity are
Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id. Utah’s  bias crime law addresses
only  offenses  committed  with  the  intent  to  “intimidate  or  terrorize”  and  with  the  intent  to  interfere  with  
a state, federal, or constitutional right. Id.
50 The states that include gender in their bias crime laws are Alaska, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. Anti-Defamation League,
State Hate Crime Statutory Provisions, http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/state_hate_crime_laws.pdf (last
visited Sept. 2, 2008).
51 The states that include disability in their bias crime laws are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
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Since many states do not have bias crime laws that include sexual
orientation, gender identity, gender, or disability as protected
characteristics, this exclusion invariably leaves many victims unable to
prosecute their crimes as bias crimes. This was exemplified by the highly
publicized murder of Matthew Shepard, a twenty-one-year-old gay college
student who was murdered in an antigay bias crime in Wyoming, a state
that does not have bias crime legislation.52 However, even in states with
bias crime laws that include these characteristics, many state and local
enforcement agencies do not have the resources to investigate and
prosecute bias crimes.53 Moreover, many state and local prosecutors and
investigators are deterred from categorizing crimes as bias crimes because
bias crimes have a high evidentiary showing and require substantial
resources to investigate and to prosecute.54 Finally, regardless of the
inclusiveness of bias crime laws, discriminatory stereotypes and beliefs
against bias crime victims may prevent state and local authorities from
categorizing a crime as a bias crime.55 For these reasons, advocates argue
that expanding federal bias crime law to include sexual orientation, gender
identity, gender, and disability is necessary to rectify the current
inadequacies of existing state bias crime legislation.

52 After the brutal murder of Matthew Shepard, advocates focused on the need for federal bias
crime legislation in light of the fact that Wyoming was one of the states that did not have a bias crimes
law. See Senators Robert Torricelli, Edward Kennedy, Barbara Boxer, and Ron Wyden, Editorial, Why
America Needs Federal Legislation Against Hate Crimes, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 26, 1998, at
A11; see also Cogan, supra note 38,  at  176  (“Over  the  years,  it  became clear that certain hate crimes
were not properly addressed by local police agencies, and the federal government had no authority to
intervene.”).      For a description of how a federal bias crime law would affect state jurisdiction in
prosecuting bias crimes, see HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: THE LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT, 4, http://www.matthewshepard.org/site/DocServer/
HRC-LLEHCPA-FAQ1-17-07.pdf?docID=463.
53 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Boyd et al., “Motivated   by   Hatred   or   Prejudice”:   Categorization of
Hate-motivated Crimes in Two Police Divisions, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV.   819,   826   (1996)   (“Many  
officers reported concerns that their time would soon be overwhelmed by persons complaining of
‘trivial’   crimes,   compromising   their   ability   to   respond   promptly   to   more   ‘serious’   crimes.”)  
(commenting  on  officers’  responses  to  a  new  policy  requiring  police  officers to investigate and classify
bias crimes); James J. Nolan & Yoshio Akiyama, An Analysis of Factors that Affect Law Enforcement
Participation in Hate Crime Reporting, 15 J. CONTEMPORARY CRIM. JUST. 111, 119–20 (1999) (finding
that resource allocation is a common factor influencing whether law enforcement reports bias crimes).
54 See, e.g., Karen Franklin, Good Intentions: The Enforcement of Hate Crime PenaltyEnhancement Statutes, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 154,  157  (2002)  (“One  of  the  major  constraints  faced  
by district attorneys—and one that it is sometimes hard for the lay public to understand—is the inherent
difficulty  in  proving  hatred  or  bias  as  a  primary  motivation.”).
55 See id.  at  156  (“Three  other  studies  support  the  notion  that  local  implementation  of  hate  crime  
laws is highly variable and contingent on numerous subjective factors, including the attitudes, beliefs,
and practices of individual officers, the perceived tractability of the problem, police funding and
training, and public opposition to hate crime policies.”); see also Boyd et al., supra note 53, at 826
(“Departmental  response  to  the  new  policy  was  mixed  at  best,  reflecting  not  only  some  officers’  dislike
of new orders requiring additional paperwork . . . but also a commonly held view on the legitimacy of
hate   crimes   as   a   special   crime   category   and   of   the   social   significance   of   hate   crimes   in   general.”);
Beverly A. McPhail & Diana M. DiNitto, Prosecutorial Perspectives on Gender-Bias Hate Crimes, 11
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1162,  1176  (2005)  (“Some  prosecutors’  opposition to the gender category
may be because of their overall skeptical view of the utility of hate crime legislation, which might
influence  their  view  of  the  gender  component.”).

WOODS

2008]

3/23/2009 7:14 PM

A Section 5 Defense of the Matthew Shepard Act

399

D. Unsuccessful Attempts to Expand Federal Bias Crime Law Prior to the
Matthew Shepard Act
From 1997 to 1999, congressional representatives attempted to expand
the scope of federal bias crime legislation by introducing the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act (HCPA).56 HCPA amended the federal criminal code to
punish bias crimes committed on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, or
disability.57 The Act also authorized appropriations to increase the number
of personnel to prevent and to respond to bias crimes that interfered with
federally protected activities under 18 U.S.C. section 245.58 Although the
House of Representatives and the Senate eventually passed the HCPA, it
was later dropped from the Department of Defense appropriations bill in
the Senate Conference Committee at the request of Republican leaders and
was thus never enacted.59
Congressional representatives later attempted to expand federal bias
crime legislation to include sexual orientation, gender, and disability by
introducing the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act (LLEEA) of
200060 and the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crime Prevention Acts
(LLEHCPA) of 200161 and 2004.62 While the LLEEA and LLEHCPA
expanded the federal government’s authority to become involved in the
investigation and prosecution of bias crimes, each required the federal state
and local government to evaluate the propriety of federal involvement.63
Despite these limiting conditions, these pieces of legislation never passed
in Congress.
Representatives again tried to expand federal bias crime legislation
with the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act (LLEHCPA)
of 2005, which also included gender identity as a protected characteristic in
the House of Representative’s version of the bill.64 The LLEHCPA
imposed the same limiting conditions upon the federal government initial
involvement in bias crime investigations and prosecutions as the LLEEA of

56 Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1997, H.R. 3081, 105th Cong. (1997); Hate Crimes Prevention
Act of 1998, S. 1529, 105th Cong. (1998); Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, S. 622, 106th Cong.
(1999); Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 1082, 106th Cong. (1999).
57 Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, H.R. 1082, 106th Cong. (1999).
58 Id. § 6(b).
59 See Hasenstab, supra note 10, at 975.
60 Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2000, H.R. 4205, 106th Cong. § 1507(a) (2000).
The Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999 (S. 622) was renamed the Local Law Enforcement Act as an
amendment to a Department of Defense authorization bill. See generally 146 Cong. Rec. S10072–73
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 2000) (Senator Leahy discussing the deletion of the Act in conference committee).
61 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2001, H.R. 1343, 107th Cong. (2001).
62 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2004, H.R. 4204, 108th Cong. (2004).
63 Id.; see also H.R. 4204 § 249(a)(2), H.R. 1343 § 249(b)(2).
64 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 2662, 109th Cong. § 2
(2005) (protecting gender identity).      The   Senate’s   version   of   the   bill   did   not   include   gender   identity.    
See Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2005, S. 1145, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (protecting
sexual orientation but not gender identity).
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2000 and the LLEHCPA of 2001 and 2004.65 Although the House of
Representatives successfully passed the LLEHCPA of 2005, the Senate
never voted on the bill after it was introduced.66
II. THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT HATE CRIMES PREVENTION ACT OF
2007 (THE MATTHEW SHEPARD ACT)
Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate
passed the Matthew Shepard Act,67 which was the latest attempt by
Congress to expand federal bias crimes legislation.68 This Part provides an
overview of the Matthew Shepard Act. Part II.A summarizes the pertinent
provisions of the Act. Part II.B summarizes Congress’ constitutional
findings supporting the legislation.
A.

Statutory Provisions

The Matthew Shepard Act expands federal bias crime law to include
actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, or disability
of the victim.69 Similar to the previous unsuccessful initiatives to expand
federal bias crime legislation, the Matthew Shepard Act provides financial
and personnel assistance to state and local governments to investigate and
to prosecute bias crimes.70 Moreover, the bill expands the federal
government’s authority to prosecute bias crimes to include bias crimes
even when the victims are not engaging in federally protected activities.71

H.R. 2662; S. 1145.
The Whip Pack, Bill Text and Background for the Week of April 30, 2007,
http://democraticwhip.house.gov/whip_pack/2007/04/30/whip_pack.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2007):
On September 14, 2005, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2662, the Local Law
Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2005 by a vote of 223 to 199. The bill was
passed as an amendment, offered by Representative John Conyers to H.R. 3132, the
Children's Safety Act of 2005, which would have strengthened the monitoring of, and
increase the penalties for child sex offenders. Although Senator Kennedy had introduced a
comparable proposal in the Senate (S. 1145), no further legislative action occurred in 109th
Congress.
67 The Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. § 6
(2007) (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)); Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 7 (2007) (same).
68 On May 3, 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Local Law Enforcement Hate
Crimes  Prevention  Act  of  2007  (“Matthew  Shepard  Act”),  H.R.  1592,  110th  Cong.  (2007)  by  a  vote  of  
237 to 180. See Derrick C. Jackson, Opinion, Optimism in the Hate Crimes Debate, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 26, 2007, at 11A. On September 27, 2007, the U.S. Senate passed its version of the Local Law
Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, by a 60 to 39 majority. See The Matthew
Shepard Foundation, Matthew Shepard Foundation Applauds U.S. Senate Today for Passing Hate
Crimes Legislation, http://www.matthewshepard.org/site/PageServer?pagename=Press_Media_Senate_
Passage_MSA.
69 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. § 6
(2007) (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)); Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate
Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 4(1)(C) (2007) (same).
70 H.R. 1592, § 4–5 (referring to S. Comm. after being received from H., May 7, 2007); S. 1105,
§ 5–6.
71 H.R. 1592, § 6; S. 1105, § 7.
65
66
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The Matthew Shepard Act also contains numerous conditions that
limit the federal government’s ability to become involved in the
investigation and prosecution of bias crimes. First, federal officers must
have “reasonable cause to believe that the actual or perceived race, color,
religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or
disability”72 of the victim was “a motivating factor underlying”73 the
offense. Second, federal officers are required to consult with state or local
law officials regarding the specific bias crime to determine whether the
federal government’s involvement is desirable and appropriate. The
federal government may only become involved if: (1) “the State [or local
government] does not have jurisdiction or does not intend to exercise
jurisdiction;” (2) “the State has requested that the Federal Government
assume jurisdiction;” (3) “the State does not object to the Federal
Government assuming jurisdiction;” or (4) “the verdict or sentence
obtained pursuant to State charges” was insufficient to eradicate the federal
government’s interest in eradicating bias-motivated violence.74 These
limitations address federalism concerns and ensure that “[s]tate and local
authorities currently investigate and prosecute the overwhelming majority
of hate crimes and will continue to do so.”75
B.

Congressional Findings

Upon enacting the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) for victims
of gender-motivated violence, Congress invoked its powers under both the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.76 To
support invoking its Section 5 power, Congress presented extensive
evidence documenting the disadvantages that victims of gender-motivated
violence face in law enforcement and judicial systems due to
discriminatory stereotypes.77 Despite recognizing that current limitations
of federal bias crime law have similarly “led to acquittals in several of the
cases in which the Department of Justice has determined a need to assert
federal jurisdiction,”78 Congress invoked only its power under the
Commerce Clause to enact the Matthew Shepard Act.79 It did not invoke
its Section 5 enforcement power.
Consequently, an overwhelming majority of the Act’s congressional
findings focus on how bias crimes affect interstate commerce.80 For
example, Congress noted that bias crimes impede the movement of targeted
H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(1)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(1)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(2)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 7 (2007).
S. REP. NO. 102-197,  at  52  (1991)  (“Congress’ power to enact title III is firmly based in the
Commerce Clause and section 5 of  the  14th  amendment  [sic].”).
77 Id. at 41–44.
78 H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 6 (2007).
79 Id. at 14–15.
80 See generally id.
72
73
74
75
76
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groups and even force them to move across state lines to escape being
subjected to violence.81 Congress also concluded that perpetrators move
across state lines to commit bias crimes and use channels, facilities, and
instrumentalities of interstate commerce to commit such violence.82
Moreover, “[m]embers of targeted groups are prevented from purchasing
goods and services, obtaining or sustaining employment, or participating in
other commercial activit[ies].”83 Since Congress did not invoke its Section
5 power to enact the Matthew Shepard Act, none of the Act’s constitutional
findings are intentionally tailored to support invoking this enforcement
power. As demonstrated in Part V infra, however, some of the Matthew
Shepard Act’s congressional findings support the notion that the Act is a
valid piece of Section 5 legislation.
III. THE MATTHEW SHEPARD ACT UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
AFTER MORRISON
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress
shall have the Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”84 The Supreme
Court’s view on the scope of Congress’ commerce power has changed over
time,85 and Congress has invoked its commerce power to adopt a wide
range of federal legislation from criminal to environmental laws.86 In
Gibbons v. Ogden87, the Court initially took an expansive approach to

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§5-4 to 5-8, at 305–17
(Foundation Press 2d ed. 1988) (explaining the changing perspectives of the Supreme Court towards
Congress’ commerce power).
86 Rosalie Berger Levinson, Will the New Federalism Be the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court?, 40
VAL. U. L. REV. 589, 592 (2006):
[M]any civil rights laws, including some criminal provisions, were enacted under the
theory   that   Congress’ Commerce Clause power was plenary. Laws prohibiting race
discrimination in public accommodations, restaurants, and hotels, as well as laws
prohibiting race, gender, and religious discrimination by private employers were enacted
under the theory that discrimination adversely affects interstate commerce and thus may be
proscribed.
See also Theodore R. Posner & Timothy M. Reif, Homage to a Bull Moose: Applying Lessons of
History to Meet the Challenges of Globalization, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 481, 500 (2000):
The   Court’s   new,   expansive   interpretation of the Commerce Clause enabled Congress to
enact  laws  in  areas  that,  under  the  Court’s  previous  approach,  would have been ruled well
beyond Congress’s  reach, including civil rights laws, labor laws, environmental laws, and
criminal laws. Challenges to these new exercises of power, most notably in the civil rights
area, generally were defeated.
87 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the
Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359,   415   (1997)   (“In   Ogden the Court accepted the notion
Congress should enjoy far-reaching power under the Commerce Clause—that Congress could legislate
regarding all commerce which concerns more than one state, and that its power would be plenary,
limited only by the Constitution's  affirmative  prohibitions  on  the  exercise  of  federal  power.”);;  see also
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 246 (Aspen 3d Ed. 2006).
81
82
83
84
85
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define the scope Congress’ commerce power. However, between 1887 and
1937, the Court adopted a much narrower view of Congress’ commerce
power.88 From 1937 to 1995, the Court revisited its expansive approach to
Congress’ commerce power by applying a very lenient rational basis test to
assess the constitutionality of federal legislation passed under the
Commerce Clause.89
In 1995, the Court decided United States v. Lopez90 and fundamentally
changed its Commerce Clause jurisprudence.91 Lopez invalidated the GunFree School Zones Act92 of 1990 and substantially restricted the amount of
activity that Congress could regulate under its commerce power. In its
analysis, the Court articulated three categories of activities that Congress
could regulate under its commerce power. First, Congress could “regulate
the use of the channels of interstate commerce.”93 Second, Congress could
legislate “to regulato [sic] and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.”94 Third, Congress could legislate to “regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.”95 The Court
invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act by concluding that the presence
of a gun near a school did not involve a channel or instrumentality of
interstate commerce,96 nor did it substantially affect interstate commerce.97
In United States v. Morrison,98 the Court placed further restrictions on
the third category of activities that Congress could regulate under Lopez99
and addressed whether a federal civil remedy for victims of gendermotivated violence under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was
constitutional.100 The plaintiff argued that violence against women had a
substantial effect on the U.S. national economy.101 The Morrison Court
considered three factors to determine whether Congress could enact the
federal civil remedy on the grounds that gender-motivated violence
88 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 87, at 247–48; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING
CONSTITUTION 131–32 (Praeger 1987).
89 See Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endangered Species Under the
Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits Over Whether the Regulated Activity is Private
Commercial Development or the Taking of Protected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 923 & n.3
(2004).
90 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
91 See generally Alan T. Dickey, United States v. Lopez: The Supreme Court Reasserts the
Commerce Clause as a Limit on the Powers of Congress, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1207 (1996).
92 The Gun-Free   School   Zones   Act   of   1990   made   it   a   federal   offense   “for   any   individual  
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe,
is a school  zone.”    18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. IV. 1992).
93 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 558–59.
96 Id. at 559.
97 Id. at 567.
98 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
99 The petitioners in Morrison did not contend that the Violence Against Women Act regulated a
channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
100 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
101 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
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substantially affected interstate commerce. First, the Court considered
whether the activity was economic in nature.102 The Court held that
“[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity.”103 Second, the Court considered whether the text of the
statute contained a jurisdictional element establishing that the statute was
enacted in pursuance of Congress’ power to regulate interstate
commerce.104 The federal civil remedy contained no such jurisdictional
element. Consequently, the Court viewed the provision as granting
Congress too much authority to regulate criminal activity, which is
traditionally regulated by the states.105 Third, the Court considered whether
Congress presented findings indicating that gender-motivated violence had
a substantial effect on interstate commerce.106 Congress presented
congressional findings that gender-motivated violence costs the American
economy billions of dollars a year and is a substantial constraint to freedom
of travel by women throughout the country.107 Although the Court agreed
Congress’ findings were more than extensive, it held that “the existence of
congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the
constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation,”108 and rejected the
federal government’s authority to regulate noneconomic violent criminal
conduct based on its cumulative effects on interstate commerce.109 The
Court maintained that to rule otherwise would eliminate boundaries
between truly local and federal affairs.110
Since the Matthew Shepard Act contains a provision providing for the
federal punishment of crimes motivated by gender, scholars argue that it is
an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ commerce power after
Morrison.111 If legally challenged, it is highly unlikely that the Court will
conclude that the Matthew Shepard Act regulates channels or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. While the Act targets activity that
involves channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, it does not
regulate those channels or instrumentalities themselves.112 Therefore, if the
Act is legally challenged, the Court will likely focus on the third category
of activity under Lopez and assess whether bias crimes motivated by sexual
orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability substantially affect
interstate commerce. The three-factor Morrison framework will likely

Id. at 610.
Id. at 613.
Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 614.
107 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803,
1853; S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41 (1990); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 33 (1990).
108 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
109 Id. at 617.
110 Id. at 617–18.
111 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
112 See Hasenstab, supra note 10, at 1006–07.
102
103
104
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guide its analysis.113
First, the Court will assess whether the activity targeted by the
Matthew Shepard Act is economic in nature. In Morrison, the Court stated:
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity. While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these
cases, thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.114

Thus, it is unlikely that the Court may conclude that bias crimes motivated
by sexual orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability are economic
in nature given that it previously rejected in Morrison that gendermotivated crimes are economic activities. Furthermore, since the Court
was hesitant to create new law on this issue in Morrison,115 it is also
unlikely to change its position on whether Congress has the authority to
regulate noneconomic activity under the Commerce Clause.
Second, the Court may consider whether the text of the Matthew
Shepard Act contains a jurisdictional element establishing that the bill was
passed in pursuance of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.116
Unlike the civil remedy of the VAWA, the Matthew Shepard Act contains
jurisdictional elements establishing a nexus between interstate commerce
and bias crimes on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender,
and disability. The Act contains jurisdictional elements that reference
crossing state lines; using a channel, facility, or instrument of interstate
commerce; using a weapon that has traveled in interstate commerce;
interfering with commercial or other economic activity; and otherwise
affecting interstate or foreign commerce.117 Therefore, the jurisdictional
element is likely to weigh in favor of upholding the Matthew Shepard Act.
Although the Morrison Court stated that “a jurisdictional element may
establish that the enactment is in pursuance of Congress’s regulation of
interstate commerce,”118 it did not conclude that the presence of a
jurisdictional element is legally dispositive.
Third, the Court may consider the adequacy of the Matthew Shepard
Act’s congressional findings. In passing the Act, Congress presented
findings establishing that bias crimes substantially affect interstate

113 Id. at 1007; see also Varona & Layton, supra note 10, at 12–14 (evaluating the
constitutionality of the Local Law Enforcement Act of 2000 in light of Morrison).
114 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
115 Id. at 615–16.
116 Some scholars emphasize this factor to defend previous attempts to expand federal bias crime
law to include sexual orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability. See, e.g., Varona & Layton,
supra note 113, at 12–14.
117 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. § 7(a)
(2007) (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)); Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement
Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th Cong. § 7(a) (2007) (same).
118 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
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commerce.119 Congress highlighted that bias crimes impede the movement
of targeted groups and force members of such groups to move across state
lines to avoid being subjected to bias crimes.120 Congress also found that
bias crimes prevent members of targeted groups from “purchasing goods
and services, obtaining or sustaining employment, or participating in other
commercial activity.”121 Moreover, perpetrators move across state lines,
use articles that have traveled in interstate commerce, and use channels,
facilities, and instrumentalities of interstate commerce to commit bias
crimes.122 But even if the Court concludes that these findings are adequate,
Morrison affirms that a valid exercise of Congress’ commerce power
cannot be exclusively grounded by congressional findings.123
In summary, of the three factors considered by the Morrison Court,
the second and the third factors will most likely weigh in favor of the
Matthew Shepard Act. The Morrison Court, however, did not adopt a
balancing test that gives equal weight to each of the three factors. Despite
agreeing with the adequacy of the congressional findings, the Court
rejected the federal government’s authority to regulate noneconomic
violent criminal conduct based on its cumulative effects on interstate
commerce.124 Instead, it gave priority to the first of the three factors when
determining whether an activity substantially affected interstate commerce.
Consequently, even if the Court concludes that the Matthew Shepard Act
contains sufficient jurisdictional hooks and congressional findings, the Act
can still be invalidated as unconstitutional under Morrison. There also is
no indication that the Court will change its position to adopt a rule
permitting Congress to regulate noneconomic activity, when in the
aggregate, it substantially affects interstate commerce. As such, Congress’
position that it has the authority to expand federal bias crime legislation
based on its commerce power is constitutionally suspect under existing
jurisprudence. For that reason, Congress should not rely exclusively on its
commerce power when reintroducing the Matthew Shepard Act in
subsequent sessions.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S CURRENT SECTION 5 JURISPRUDENCE
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to
enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.125 The
Court’s approach to Section 5 has been a matter of constant evolution. In
the early years of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was skeptical of

119
120
121
122
123
124
125

H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 2 (2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
Id. at 617.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power.126 However, during the 1960s the
Court granted Congress more deference to pass Section 5 legislation due to
the aftermath of the New Deal.127 This deferential approach lasted until
1997, when the Court revoked this deference in City of Boerne v. Flores.128
Part IV.A provides a brief summary of City of Boerne and the
constitutional principles that originate from it. Part IV.B focuses on the
Section 5 cases after City of Boerne and provides a synthesis of what
Congress must prove in order to invoke its Section 5 enforcement power
under the current Section 5 jurisprudence.
A.

City of Boerne v. Flores

City of Boerne v. Flores129 is the foundational case in the Supreme
Court’s current Section 5 jurisprudence. In City of Boerne, the Court held
that Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).130 RFRA allowed Congress to invalidate any law
that imposed a substantial burden on religious practice unless it was
justified by a compelling interest and was the least restrictive means of
accomplishing that interest.131
The Court agreed that under Section 5, Congress had the ability to
enforce the constitutional right of free exercise of religion.132 However, the
Court held that Congress only has the right to “enforce” the law in a
remedial sense;133 it cannot substantively change the law.134 The Court
acknowledged that the line between a remedial and substantive change is
not clear.135 Therefore, to discern remedial and substantive changes, the
Court adopted the “congruence and proportionality” test.136 Under this test,
“[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”137 The Court

126 Post & Siegel, supra note 20, at 1945 (“In the early years of the Fourteenth Amendment the
Court was quite hostile to Section 5  power,  fearing  that  it  might  ‘authorize Congress to create a code of
municipal law for the   regulation   of   private   rights’ that   would   displace   “the   domain   of   State  
legislation.”)  (quoting  The  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883)).
127 Id.
128 521 U.S. 507 (1997); id. at 536; see also Araiza, supra note 23, at 11  (“Starting  with  City of
Boerne,  the  Court  began  to  cut  back  on  the  deference  it  had  previously  given  to  Congress’  decisions  to  
use  its  Section  5  power.”).
129 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
130 Id. at 536.
131 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
132 City of Boerne, 521  U.S.  at  519  (“We  agree  with  respondent,  of  course,  that  Congress  can  enact  
legislation  under  §  5  enforcing  the  constitutional  right  to  free  exercise  of  religion.”).
133 Id.
134 Id. (“Congress  does  not  enforce  a  constitutional  right  by  changing  what  the  right is. It has been
given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”).
135 Id. at 519–20.
136 Id. at 520.
137 Id.
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concluded that legislation is substantive in operation and effect without
such a connection.138
In applying the congruence and proportionality test to strike down
RFRA, the Court considered three factors. First, the Court evaluated
RFRA’s legislative record, finding that the “legislative record lack[ed]
examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because
of religious bigotry.”139 The Court thus concluded that in passing RFRA,
Congress seemed to be concerned with the incidental burdens that state
laws had upon the exercise of religious freedom, and not whether the laws
were enforced because of animus.140
Second, the Court looked to the scope of RFRA and found it to be too
sweeping.141 The Court distinguished the scope of RFRA from voting
rights legislation upheld under Section 5 in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach.142 Unlike RFRA, the statutory provisions at issue in
Katzenbach were confined to those regions of the country where voting
discrimination was the most flagrant and affected a discrete case of laws—
state voting laws.143 Moreover, the Court held that to reduce the possibility
of overbreadth and to ensure that the reach of the voting rights legislation
was limited to those cases in which constitutional violations were the most
likely, Katzenbach terminated voting legislation “at the behest of States and
political subdivisions in which the danger of substantial voting
discrimination has not materialized during the preceding five years.”144
RFRA did not contain this limitation.
Finally, the Court looked to the costs of RFRA. The Court
emphasized that RFRA imposed a heavy litigation burden and curtailed the
states’ traditional regulatory powers.145 The Court concluded that these
costs were too great and “far exceed[ed] any pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause.”146

Id.
Id. at 530
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532 (citations omitted):
RFRA is not so confined. Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description
and  regardless  of  subject  matter.    RFRA’s  restrictions  apply  to  every  agency  and  official  of  
the Federal, State, and local Governments. RFRA applies to all federal and state law,
statutory or otherwise, whether adopted before or after its enactment. RFRA has no
termination date or termination mechanism. Any law is subject to challenge at any time by
any individual who alleges a substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion.
142 383 U.S. 301, 315–16 (1966).
143 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532–33.
144 Id. at 533 (citations omitted).
145 Id. at 534–35   (“[RFRA]   is   a   reality   of   the   modern   regulatory state that numerous state laws,
such as the zoning regulations at issue here, impose a substantial burden on a large class of
individuals. . . . [T]he Act imposes in every case a least restrictive means requirement . . . that was not
used pre-Smith jurisprudence . . . .”).
146 Id. at 534.
138
139
140
141

WOODS

3/23/2009 7:14 PM

2008]
B.

A Section 5 Defense of the Matthew Shepard Act

409

Section 5 Cases after City of Boerne

Since City of Boerne, the Supreme Court has decided six cases
addressing whether an enacted federal statute was a valid exercise of
Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power.147 In every case, the Court has
applied the congruence and proportionality test and has generally
performed a two-step analysis. First, the Court has identified whether a
constitutional rights violation existed. Second, the Court has assessed the
scope of the federal statute. The Court has deemed federal legislation as a
valid exercise of Congress’ Section 5 power only when the scope of the
legislation was tailored specifically to rectify an existing constitutional
rights violation.148
1. Identifying the Constitutional Rights Violation
In identifying a pattern of constitutional rights violations, the Court
has considered two factors: (1) the level of scrutiny that a group
classification or right receives149 and (2) the adequacy of the congressional
findings supporting the existence of a constitutional rights violation.150
i. Standard of Review
Generally, the Court has concluded that the higher the level of
scrutiny that a group classification or a right receives, the easier it is for
Congress to identify a pattern of constitutional rights violations by means
of congressional findings.151 For instance, in Kimel v. Florida Board of
147 These six cases are Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001); Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003); Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
148 See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 739–40 (upholding the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FLMA)
as valid Section 5 legislation); Lane, 541 U.S. at 530–31 (upholding Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) as valid Section 5 legislation).
149 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (applying rational basis review for age classifications); Garrett, 531 U.S.
at 367–68 (applying rational basis review for disability classifications); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735–36
(applying intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications); Lane, 541 U.S. at 522–23 (applying
heightened scrutiny for burdening the right of access to the courts).
150 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530–32; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640; Garrett, 531 U.S. at
374; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626–27.
151 The Court has contextualized congressional findings in terms of the level of scrutiny that a
group classification or right receives. See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86  (“Judged  against  the  backdrop  of  
our equal protection jurisprudence, it is clear that the ADEA is so out of proportion to a supposed
remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional   behavior.”   (quoting   City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532) (internal quotations omitted));
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365  (“The  first   step  in  applying  these  now  familiar  principles  is  to   identify with
some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue. Here, that inquiry requires us to examine
the limitations § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment   places   upon   States’   treatment   of   the   disabled.”);;
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736  (“Because  the  standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based
classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-basis test . . . it was easier for Congress to show
a pattern of state constitutional   violations.”);;   Lane, 541 U.S. at 522–23 (“Title II . . . also seeks to
enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more
searching  judicial  review.”).
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Regents,152 the Court evaluated whether Congress exceeded the scope of its
Section 5 enforcement power by enacting the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).153 The Court noted that unlike race or
gender, “[o]lder persons . . . have not been subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment.”154 Nor does “old age . . . define a discrete
and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life
spans, will experience it.”155 Thus, for equal protection purposes, the Court
believed that all age classifications are “presumptively rational”156 unless
Congress could establish that age discrimination is not supported by a
rational basis.157 Since Congress could not meet this burden, the Court held
that the ADEA’s enactment was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’
Section 5 enforcement power.158 In Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett,159 the Court engaged in a similar equal protection
analysis to invalidate portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).160
Conversely, in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,161
the Supreme Court held that Congress did not exceed the scope of its
Section 5 enforcement power when it gave a private right of action for
individuals to seek equitable relief and money damages against any state or
federal employer who restrains their rights under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (FLMA).162 The Court distinguished the case from
Garrett and Kimel by arguing that discrimination based on gender, unlike
disability, is subject to a heightened standard of review under the
Fourteenth Amendment.163 The Court stated explicitly that “[b]ecause the
528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
Id. at 86. The ADEA made it unlawful for an employer, including the  state,  to  “fail  or  refuse  to  
hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such
individual’s  age.”    29  U.S.C.  §  623(a)(1).
154 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (internal citations omitted).
155 Id.
156 Id. at 84.
157 Id. at   83   (“States   may   discriminate   on   the   basis   of   age   without   offending   the   Fourteenth  
Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally  related  to  a  legitimate  state  interest.”).
158 Id. at 86.
159 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
160 Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000)
(allowing state employees to recover money damages if the state failed to comply with the ADA by not
making reasonable accommodations for employers with disabilities); see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367–
68. As in Kimel, before applying the congruence and proportionality test, the Court revisited precedent
affirming that states are not required to make special accommodations for individuals with disabilities
under the Fourteenth Amendment if the failure to provide accommodations was supported by a rational
basis. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367. The Court then assessed the legislative history in the context of this
equal protection analysis to determine whether the legislative history of the ADA supported a pattern of
unconstitutional employment discrimination by the states against individuals with disabilities. Id.
161 538 U.S. 721, 734–35 (2003).
162 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (entitling employees to take up to twelve work weeks of unpaid
leave annually  for  any  set  of  reasons,  including  the  onset  of  a  serious  health  condition  in  an  employee’s  
spouse, child, or parent.); see also Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728 n.2 (noting Congress intended for the FLMA
to protect the right of employees to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace and
viewed the responsibility of caretaking to disproportionately burden women).
163 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735–36.
152
153
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standard for demonstrating the constitutionality of a gender-based
classification is more difficult to meet than our rational-basis test . . . it was
easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”164
Similarly, in Tennessee v. Lane,165 the Supreme Court held that
Congress did not exceed the scope of its Section 5 enforcement power
when it enacted Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).166
The specific question presented to the Court was limited to whether
Congress could invoke its Section 5 enforcement power to ensure the rights
of access to the courts.167 Congress posited that many individuals with
disabilities in states throughout the country were being excluded from
courthouses and court proceedings by reason of their disabilities.168 The
Court believed that heightened scrutiny applied because Title II not only
served to redress irrational disability discrimination, but also to enforce “a
variety of other basic constitutional guarantees, infringements of which are
subject to more searching judicial review.”169
Thus, Section 5 cases after City of Boerne reveal that Congress’
burden to identify by congressional findings a pattern of constitutional
rights violations is lessened when a group classification or a burdened right
receives heightened scrutiny.
ii. Congressional Findings
In City of Boerne, the Court concluded that the congressional findings
of RFRA were inadequate to identify a constitutional rights violation
because they lacked examples demonstrating that states had violated free
exercise of religion rights.170 In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings171—the first Section 5 decision after
City of Boerne—the Court employed an even higher threshold requiring
Congress not only to identify examples of unconstitutional behavior, but
also to identify a pattern of constitutional rights infringements by the

164 Id. at 736.
To satisfy rational basis review, Congress must only show that a group
classification or burdening of a right is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Kimel, 528 U.S.
at 83. However, to satisfy intermediate scrutiny—the standard of review applied to gender
classifications—Congress must show that the classification serves important governmental objectives
and is substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
165 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004).
166 Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–65 (providing that
“no   qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected  to  discrimination  by  any  such  entity”).
167 Lane, 541 U.S. at 530–31.
168 Id. at 527.
169 Id. at 522–23.
170 City  of  Boerne  v.  Flores,  521  U.S.  507,  530  (1997)  (“RFRA’s  legislative  record  lacks  examples  
of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry. The history of
persecution in this country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40
years.”).
171 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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states.172 In cases after Florida Prepaid, the Court has required Congress
to establish a pattern of constitutional rights violations, making it a basic
requirement of the Court’s current Section 5 framework.173
The Court has not provided further explicit guidance on what
Congress must show in order to establish a pattern of constitutional rights
violations. However, a few points from Section 5 decisions after Florida
Prepaid are instructive. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama
v. Garrett,174 the Court concluded that Congress did not meet its burden to
establish a pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the
states against the disabled upon enacting 42 U.S.C. sections 12111–17 of
Title I of the American Disabilities Act (ADA).175 The Court held that with
the exceptions of a few examples involving state behavior, Congress only
proffered general evidence that people with disabilities have been
discriminated against and socially ostracized.176 Therefore, after Garrett,
findings of general discrimination not tailored to the alleged state
misbehavior are insufficient to establish a pattern of unconstitutional state
discrimination.
Furthermore, after United States v. Morrison177, constitutional findings
demonstrating a pattern of constitutional rights violations will not
necessarily render an invocation of Congress’ enforcement power valid. In
Morrison, the Supreme Court held that Congress exceeded the scope of its
Section 5 enforcement power by enacting VAWA.178 Congress found that
gender stereotypes “often result in insufficient investigation and
prosecution of gender-motivated crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior
and credibility of the victims of that crime, and unacceptably lenient
punishments for those who are actually convicted of gender-motivated
violence.”179 Despite the sufficiency of the findings, the Court invalided
the law because it was too sweeping.180 Therefore, Morrison highlights
that extensive congressional findings are not necessarily sufficient to prove

172 In light of this higher threshold, the congressional findings in Florida Prepaid were inadequate
to identify a pattern of constitutional rights violations by the states. Id. at 640 (“The   House   Report  
acknowledged that many states comply with patent law and could provide only two examples of patent
infringement suits against the States. . . . The Federal Circuit in its opinion identified only eight patentinfringement   suits   prosecuted   against   the   States   in   the   110   years   between   1880   and   1990.”) (internal
citations omitted).
173 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of   Regents,   528   U.S.   62,   89   (2000)   (“Congress never identified any
pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the
level   of   constitutional   violation.”); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001)
(‘Once we have determined the metes and bounds of the constitutional right in question, we examine
whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the
States  against  the  disabled.”).
174 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
175 Id. at 374.
176 Id. at 369.
177 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
178 Id. at 627.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 626–27.
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that an exercise of Congress’ Section 5 power is valid.
2. Assessing the Scope of the Federal Statute
Regardless of whether congressional findings support a pattern of
constitutional rights violations, the federal statute must not be too
sweeping. Although not firmly established in precedent, the Court seems
to balance the following three factors to determine whether a federal statute
is tailored proportionally to redress a pattern of constitutional rights
violations: (1) the extent to which the law is limited to situations involving
unconstitutional behavior;181 (2) whether state remedies are adequate and
present throughout the states;182 and (3) whether the law targets the
behavior of government or private actors.183
i. The Federal Statute’s Focus on Unconstitutional Behavior
In evaluating whether a federal statute is tailored specifically to
redress unconstitutional behavior, the Court has considered the following:
(1) the specific question presented for review;184 (2) whether the statute’s
application is limited to geographic areas where unconstitutional behavior
is known or likely to occur;185 and (3) whether the federal statute’s
application is limited to a range of activity where unconstitutional behavior
is known or likely to occur.186
The Court’s holding in Tennessee v. Lane,187 the last Section 5 case to
be decided by the Court, supports the notion that when a federal statute
targets an activity, the Court may frame its assessment of the statute’s
scope to the specific question presented for judicial review. In Lane, the
petitioner urged the Court to examine the broad range of Title II’s
applications and argued that it was not tailored to serve its objectives
because it applied not only to public education and voting-booth access, but
also to seating at state-owned hockey rinks.188 The Court rejected that it
had to evaluate Title II’s wide variety of applications when the specific
question presented for review only dealt with whether the Act was an
appropriate exercise of Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power to remedy
the inaccessibility of judicial services for individuals with disabilities.189

181 See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646–47; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626–27; Garrett, 531 U.S. at
372; Nev.  Dep’t  of  Human  Res.  v.  Hibbs,  538  U.S.  721, 733–34 (2003); Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
530–31 (2004).
182 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 644; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91–92; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9;
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 733–34.
183 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 637 (1883); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883);
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626–27.
184 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 530–31.
185 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646–47; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626–27.
186 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 733–34.
187 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
188 Id. at 530.
189 Id. at 530–31.
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To determine whether a federal statute is limited to addressing
unconstitutional behavior, the Court has also considered whether the
statute’s application is limited to geographic areas where unconstitutional
behavior is known or likely to occur. In Florida Prepaid, the Court found
that the coverage of the Patent Remedy Act was too sweeping because it
made all states amenable to suit for any type of patent infringement for an
infinite duration.190 Moreover, Congress did nothing to limit the Act’s
scope to cases involving constitutional violations nor did it limit its
application to states where there were high incidences of unconstitutional
patent violations.191 Similarly, in Morrison, the Court held that VAWA’s
federal civil remedy was too sweeping because it applied uniformly to all
states throughout the nation even though the congressional findings did not
indicate that the problem of discrimination against victims of gendermotivated violence occurred in all or even most states.192 The Morrison
Court distinguished the case from Katzenbach v. Morgan193 and South
Carolina v. Katzenbach,194 two Section 5 cases prior to City of Boerne in
which the federal “remedy was directed only to those States in which
Congress found that there had been discrimination.”195 Therefore, the
Court favors federal remedies that make geographic differentiations among
states where constitutional rights violations are the most likely to occur or
are most pervasive.
The Court has also evaluated whether a federal statute’s application is
limited to an area of activity where unconstitutional behavior is known or
likely to occur. For instance, the Garrett Court concluded that the scope of
Title I of the ADA was too sweeping because it forced state employers to
make reasonable accommodations in situations where it was reasonable for
them to conserve scarce resources by hiring employees who were able to
use the existing nonaccommodating facilities.196 Consequently, the statute
forced state employers to provide reasonable accommodations despite the
fact that disability classifications passed rational basis review.197
Conversely, in Hibbs, the Court upheld the provision of the FMLA because
it did not apply broadly to every aspect of a state employer’s operations.198
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646–47:
Despite subjecting States to this expansive liability, Congress did nothing to limit the
coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such as where a
State refuses to offer any state-court remedy for patent owners whose patents it had
infringed. Nor did it make any attempt to confine the reach of the Act by limiting the
remedy to certain types of infringement, such as nonnegligent infringement or infringement
authorized pursuant to state policy; or providing for suits only against States with
questionable remedies or a high incidence of infringement.
191 Id.
192 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626–27 (2000).
193 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
194 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
195 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626–27.
196 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001).
197 Id. at 366.
198 Nev.  Dep’t  of  Human  Res.  v.  Hibbs,  538  U.S.  721,  738  (2003).
190
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Rather, the provision was narrowly targeted “at the faultline between work
and family”199 which was the precise area where “sex-based
overgeneralization has been and remains strongest.”200
ii. Adequacy of State Remedies
To determine whether a federal statute is too sweeping, the Court has
also considered the adequacy of existing state remedies to address the
identified pattern of constitutional violations. In Florida Prepaid, the
Court rejected Congress’ rationale for enacting the Patent Remedy Act
because expert testimony only established that the available state remedies
were less convenient than the federal remedies, not that the state remedies
were constitutionally inadequate.201 Moreover, in Kimel, the Court found
that the ADEA was unnecessary because state employees were protected
by state age discrimination statutes and could recover damages from their
state employers in almost every state.202 Similarly, in Garrett, the Court
highlighted that state laws existed to provide employed persons with
disabilities an avenue of relief.203 However, in Hibbs, the Court upheld the
disputed provision of the FLMA after concluding that state law remedies
were inadequate to address the identified pattern of constitutional rights
violations.204 The Hibbs Court particularly emphasized the state remedies’
exclusiveness and their lack of coverage.205
Id. at 738.
Id.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644 (1999):
The primary point made by these witnesses . . . was not that state remedies were
constitutionally inadequate, but rather that they were less convenient than federal remedies,
and might undermine the uniformity of patent law. . . . Congress itself said nothing about
the existence or adequacy of state remedies in the statute or in the Senate Report, and made
only a few fleeting references to state remedies in the House Report, essentially repeating
the testimony of the witnesses.
202 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91–92  (2000)  (“State  employees  are  protected by
state age discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from their state employers, in almost
every State of the Union. Those avenues of relief remain available today, just as they were before this
decision.”).
203 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of  Ala.  v.  Garrett,  531  U.S.  356,  374  n.9  (2001)  (“[S]tate  laws  protecting  
the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other aspects of life provide independent
avenues of redress.”).
204 Nev.  Dep’t  of  Human  Res.  v.  Hibbs,  538  U.S.  721, 733–34 (2003).
205 Id. The Hibbs Court reasoned:
Furthermore,  the  dissent's  statement  that  some  States  “had  adopted  some  form  of  familycare  leave”  before  the  FMLA's  enactment . . . glosses over important shortcomings of some
state policies. First, seven States had childcare leave provisions that applied to women
only. Indeed, Massachusetts required that notice of its leave provisions be posted only in
“establishment[s]   in   which   females   are   employed.”      These   laws   reinforced   the   very  
stereotypes that Congress sought to remedy through the FMLA. Second, 12 States
provided their employees no family leave, beyond an initial childbirth or adoption, to care
for a seriously ill child or family member. Third, many States provided no statutorily
guaranteed right to family leave, offering instead only voluntary or discretionary leave
programs. Three States left the amount of leave time primarily in employers' hands.
Congress could reasonably conclude that such discretionary family-leave programs would
do little to combat the stereotypes about the roles of male and female employees that
199
200
201
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iii. Targeting Government versus Private Behavior
Finally, the Court has considered whether a federal statute targets
government or private conduct when assessing the statute’s scope. Federal
statutes that target private behavior exclusively are too sweeping under
existing doctrine. For instance, in Morrison, the Court invalidated
VAWA’s federal civil remedy because it was aimed at private individuals
who committed the criminal acts, not the discrimination by state officials
that the Court agreed violated the Fourteenth Amendment.206 To invalidate
VAWA’s federal civil remedy, the Court revisited United States v.
Harris207 and the Civil Rights Cases,208 early Section 5 cases prior to City
of Boerne, in which the Court invalidated federal laws on the grounds that
they were directed exclusively against the actions of private persons.209
V. THE SECTION 5 CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE MATTHEW
SHEPARD ACT
This Part demonstrates that Congress has the constitutional authority
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Matthew
Shepard Act. In Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court affirmed Congress’
authority to invoke its Section 5 enforcement power to pass federal
legislation ensuring equal access to the courts for individuals with
disabilities.210 Based on this principle, I posit that it is legitimate for
Congress to invoke its Section 5 power to expand federal bias crime
legislation in order to ensure equal access to the courts for bias crime
victims targeted because of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender, and
disability. Therefore, Congress should invoke its Section 5 enforcement
power when reintroducing the Act in subsequent sessions.
Congress sought to eliminate. Finally, four States provided leave only through
administrative regulations or personnel policies, which Congress could reasonably
conclude offered significantly less firm protection than a federal law. Against the above
backdrop  of  limited  state  leave  policies,  no  matter  how  generous  petitioners’  own  may  have  
been . . . Congress was justified in enacting the FMLA as remedial legislation.”   (internal  
citations omitted).
Id.

206 United   States   v.   Morrison,   529   U.S.   598,   626   (2000)   (“Section   13981   is   not   aimed   at  
proscribing discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe; it is
directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated
by  gender  bias.”).
207 106 U.S. 629 (1883). The Morrison Court stated:
In Harris, the Court considered a challenge to § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. . . . We
concluded that this law exceeded Congress’   §   5   power   because   the   law   was   directed  
exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State,
or their administration by her officers.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621 (quoting Harris, 106 U.S. at 640) (quotations omitted).
208 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Morrison Court  noted  that  “[w]e  reached  a  similar  conclusion  in  the  
Civil Rights Cases. . . . [W]e held that the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, which applied to purely private conduct, were beyond the scope of the § 5 enforcement power.”    
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
209 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621–22.
210 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004).
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Part V.A focuses on the pattern of constitutional rights violations and
posits that discriminatory stereotypes, resource constraints, and social
skepticism of bias crime laws prevent bias crimes on the basis of sexual
orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability from being investigated
and prosecuted adequately. These factors consistently prevent bias crime
cases from reaching the courts, and thus inhibit bias crime victims from
receiving compensation for their crimes and permit bias crime perpetrators
to get away with their crimes. Part V.B shows that the Court should not
consider the Matthew Shepard Act as too sweeping because multiple
provisions of the Act limit its scope to address situations where bias crime
victims’ rights of access to the courts are being deprived.
A. The Pattern of Constitutional Rights Violations: Unequal Access to
Courts
In Kimel, Garrett, Hibbs, and Lane, the Supreme Court affirmed that
the standard of review attached to a classification or right influences the
amount of findings that Congress must present to show a pattern of
constitutional rights violations.211 My Section 5 argument is based on the
standard of review attached to the right of access to the courts, as opposed
to the level of scrutiny afforded to sexual orientation, gender identity,
gender, and disability classifications.212 In Lane, the Court held that a right
of access to the courts is a “basic constitutional guarantee”213 and is
afforded “more searching judicial review”214 when infringed. Therefore,
when evaluating whether a pattern of constitutional rights violations exists,
the Court should give greater deference to congressional findings
establishing that the right of access to the courts is burdened.
The following analysis demonstrates that if Congress invokes its
Section 5 enforcement power to enact the Matthew Shepard Act, then it
will be able to present extensive congressional findings demonstrating that
bias crime victims targeted because of sexual orientation, gender identity,
gender, and disability are deprived of their rights of access to the courts.
Discriminatory stereotypes, resource constraints, and social skepticism
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
Currently, sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability classifications only receive
rational basis review. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (concluding that a Colorado
constitutional amendment that banned sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws within the state failed
rational basis review); Erik K. Ludwig, Protecting Laws Designed to Remedy Anti-Gay Discrimination
from Equal Protection Challenges: The Desirability of Rational Basis Scrutiny, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
513,   538   n.   145   (2006)   (concluding   that   “[d]espite   the fact that gender identity would arguably
constitute sex and therefore make it a quasi-suspect classification subject to intermediate scrutiny, the
courts that have considered transsexuality have applied rational basis review.”);;   City   of   Cleburne   v.  
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (applying rational basis review to invalidate a
municipality’s  denial  of  a  permit  to  a  home  for  people  with  mental  disabilities).    The  standard  of  review  
for gender classifications is intermediate scrutiny. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33
(1996).
213 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004).
214 Id. at 522-23.
211
212
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towards bias crime laws prevent bias crimes on the basis of sexual
orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability from being adequately
addressed. These factors prevent bias crime victims from reporting their
crimes to the police, prevent police officers from classifying and reporting
these crimes to prosecutors as bias crimes, and prevent prosecutors from
prosecuting these crimes as bias crimes. Therefore, Congress will be able
to satisfy its initial burden to identify a pattern of constitutional rights
violations under the Court’s current Section 5 jurisprudence.
1. Fear to Report Bias Crimes
Before police officers can become involved in a bias crime
investigation, the victim must report the crime. Bias crimes are severely
underreported.215 One significant factor affecting underreporting is
victims’ fears that police officers will be unresponsive to the incident
because they are biased against the groups to which they belong.216
Fears of police insensitivity are especially pertinent in cases involving
bias crimes motivated by sexual orientation, gender identity, gender, and
disability. The most frequently cited reason among victims of anti-LGBT
violence is fear that reporting the incident will result in secondary
victimization by the police.217 Discriminatory stereotypes also prevent
victims of gender-motivated violence from reporting bias crimes to the
police.218 Upon passing the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), the
Senate reported that “any person would think twice before reporting and
prosecuting a crime if the police responded by demanding a polygraph
exam, the prosecutor suggested that the victim had not complained
promptly enough . . . and the judge announced to the jury at the end of the
trial that the victim’s testimony under oath should be viewed with
suspicion.”219 Disability bias crimes are also severely underreported.
Researchers posit that one reason influencing underreporting is a
215 Rubenstein, supra note 38, at 1219   (“There   are   a   variety   of   reasons   that   hate   crime   victims  
might not  report.”);;  Cogan,  supra note 38 at 179  (“[S]ocial  science  research  shows  that  hate  crimes  are  
less likely to be reported to the police than random crimes.”);;  FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING
HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW 23 (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (noting that many victims
fail   to   report   hate   crimes   “due   to   factors   such   as   [the   victim’s   entrenched]   distrust   of   the   police,  
language barriers, the fear of retaliation by the offender, and the fear of courting  exposure”).
216 See, e.g., Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, “On   the   Basis   of   Sex”:   Recognizing  
Gender-Based Bias Crimes, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 26 (1994) (finding that reasons for failing to
report bias crimes include shame, fear, distrust, embarrassment, belief that authorities are
unsympathetic,   and   fear   of   “secondary   trauma”   from   the   legal   system);;   see also Anthony S. Winer,
Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. L. REV. 387, 413–14 (1994)
(citing as one reason why gays and lesbians are hesitant to report hate crimes is the resulting stigma that
would result from exposing their sexual orientations).
217 Nolan & Akiyama, supra note 53 at 114; see also Winer, supra note 216, at 413–14 (positing
that one reason why gays and lesbians are reluctant to report bias crimes is the stigma that would result
from exposing their sexual orientations).
218 Weisburd & Levin, supra note 216, at 26 (listing the reasons for failing to report bias crimes as
include shame, fear, distrust, embarrassment, the belief that authorities are unsympathetic, and fear of
further victimization).
219 S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 44–45 (1993).
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widespread perception among individuals with disabilities that reporting
their crimes will be useless.220 This perception is perpetuated by the fact
that only one case has been successfully prosecuted as a disability bias
crime in the United States.221
The Matthew Shepard Act will not eliminate all of the factors that
cause bias crimes to be underreported. It is even possible that the Matthew
Shepard Act will not influence victims to report their crimes. However, the
Act has the potential to make two substantial improvements. First, the
Matthew Shepard Act provides local and state authorities with financial
and personnel assistance to help train officers to sensitively respond to all
bias crime victims, and especially victims targeted because of sexual
orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability.222 Greater sensitivity
training may increase the likelihood that bias crime victims will feel
comfortable reporting their crimes. Second, the Matthew Shepard Act
contains a provision allowing the federal government to become involved
in bias crime investigations and prosecutions if “the verdict or sentence
obtained pursuant to State charges left demonstratively unvindicated the
Federal interest in eradicating bias-motivated violence.”223 Although state
and local governments will continue to investigate and prosecute the
majority of bias crimes under the Matthew Shepard Act,224 this provision
may increase the likelihood that bias crime victims will report their crimes
220 Daniel D. Sorensen, Invisible Victims, Aug. 9, 2002, http://www.aspires-relationships.com/
the_invisible_victims.pdf:
[T]here is evidence that crimes against people with substantial disabilities are often not
reported (result in a crime report). . . . I estimate that less than 4.5% of serious crimes
committed against people with disabilities in California have been reported compared to
44%   for   the   general   population.      This   is   based   on   an   analysis   of   California’s   Adult  
Protective System data compared to National Crime Victimization Survey data.
See also Press Release, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Kathleen Maclay, Flawed FBI reporting system
undercounts disability hate crimes, (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.berkeley.edu/
news/media/releases/2002/12/18_crimes.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2008) ("It's no surprise that hate
crimes are underreported, but the disparity between reporting disability hate crimes and other crimes is
staggering.”)   (quoting   Jack   Glaser,   Assistant   Professor, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley Goldman School of
Pub.  Pol’y).
221 Mark Sherry, Don’t  Ask,  Tell  or  Respond:  Silent  Acceptance of Disability Hate Crimes, Jan. 8,
2003, http://dawn.thot.net/disability_hate_crimes.html. According to the article:
There is a notoriously low rate of prosecution and conviction for hate crimes. In fact, only
one disability hate crime has ever been successfully prosecuted. . . . . On January 30, 1999,
Eric Krochmaluk, a cognitively disabled man from Middletown NJ [sic], was kidnapped,
choked, beaten, burned with cigarettes, taped to a chair, his eyebrows were shaved, and he
was then abandoned in a forest. Eight people were subsequently indicted for this hate
crime; the first prosecution of a disability hate crime in America.
222 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. §§ 3(b),
4, 5 (2007); Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105,
110th Cong. §§ 4(b), 5, 6 (2007). A detailed analysis of the insensitivity that bias crime victims
experience from law enforcement officials and prosecutors is provided in Part III(A)(ii)–(iii).
223 H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007) (proposing amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(2)(D)); S.
1105, 110th Cong. § 7 (2007) (same).
224 H.R. REP. 110-113,  at  7  (2007)  (“It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  State  and  local authorities
currently investigate and prosecute the overwhelming majority of hate crimes and will continue to do so
under this legislation.”).
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because unresponsive state and local enforcement actions and judicial
decisions will not go unchecked.
2. Failure to Classify Crimes as Bias Crimes
The mere existence of state and local bias crime laws does not ensure
that the laws will be adequately implemented. Enforcement officers play
important roles in responding to bias crime incidents because they control
evidence collection and initially interact with victims, witnesses, and
perpetrators.225 Enforcement officers are also responsible for referring bias
crime cases to prosecutors.226 Even in California, the first state to enact a
state bias crime law,227 police officials refer substantially fewer bias crime
cases to prosecutors than are reported. In 2006, only 363 bias crimes were
referred to prosecutors out of 1,306 total reported bias crimes in
California.228 The ratio of cases referred to prosecutors by police officials
to the number of reported bias crimes in California was similar from 2000
through 2005.229
Researchers have broadly concluded that the
implementation of bias crime laws depend on subjective factors, such as
“the attitudes, beliefs, and practices of individual officers, the perceived
tractability of the problem, police funding and training, and public
opposition to hate crime policies.”230
Personal skepticism towards bias crimes is one factor that has
influenced enforcement officers not to classify crimes as bias crimes.
Many officers refuse to classify crimes as bias crimes because they do not
believe that bias crimes deserve special treatment.231 Researchers have also
found that police officers will not classify less violent crimes, such as
simple assault or intimidation, as bias crimes because they believe that the
incidents “can become so high-profile that they would have preferred not to

225 AM. PROSECUTOR’S RESEARCH INST., A LOCAL PROSECUTOR’S GUIDE FOR RESPONDING TO
HATE CRIMES 15 (2000), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/hate_crimes.pdf (last checked Sept. 2,
2008) (“Local   law   enforcement   agencies   play   a   critical   role   in   responses   to   hate   crimes.      As   the  
responding agency to allegations of bias-motivated crimes, their officers and victim/witness personnel
can document overt signs of hate motivation and set the tone with victims and witness that can impact
their  cooperation.”).
226 Franklin, supra note 54, at 155   (“In   terms   of   effective   enforcement,   probably   the   most  
important decisions are those made at the outset by investigating officers, who decide whether to
categorize a crime as bias driven.”).    See generally Nolan & Akiyama, supra note 53.
227 Cogan, supra note 38, at 173.
228 Cal.   Dep’t   Just.,   Hate   Crime   in   California,   14   (2006),   available at http://ag.ca.gov/
cjsc/publications/hatecrimes/hc06/preface06.pdf.
229 See, generally, Publications, California Department of Justice - Criminal Justice Statistics
Center, HATE CRIMES IN CALIFORNIA, available at http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/pubs.php#hate (collecting
reports from 1995 through 2007).
230 Franklin, supra note 54, at 156.
231 Boyd et al., supra note 53, at 827  (“A  few  officers  expressed the belief that hate crimes should
not   be   considered   crimes   at   all.      They   are   just   ‘human   nature’   or   the   normal   expression of hostility
among   people   living   in   crowded   conditions.”); Nolan & Akiyama, supra note 53, at   114   (“Other  
officers have indicated that they personally do not believe that it is appropriate to treat hate crimes as
something  special.”).
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have made such a distinction.”232 Many officers have reported that they
would be overwhelmed by “trivial” complaints if less serious crimes were
classified as bias crimes, which would compromise their ability to respond
to more “serious” crimes.233 These attitudes have led to only a narrow
subset of bias crimes to be pursued as bias crimes, perpetuating the
erroneous belief that bias crimes occur infrequently.234
Resource constraints have also influenced enforcement officers to
avoid classifying and reporting crimes as bias crimes. Bias crimes are
incredibly burdensome to investigate235 because of the high evidentiary
burden to prove a bias motive.236 These investigative difficulties cause
officers to only investigate underlying crimes, such as assault or murder,
but not the parallel bias crimes. Moreover, many enforcement agencies
that claim to have special units focusing on bias crime investigations do not
provide officers with specialized training.237 Consequently, police officers
may lack the skills to recognize that a particular crime is a bias crime.
Ambiguities may also arise during investigations that make it difficult for
officers to discern whether crimes are bias crimes.238 For example,
evidence of provocation might complicate whether a crime should be
classified as a bias crime.239
Public opposition to bias crime laws also deters police officers from
classifying or reporting a crime as a bias crime.240 Community norms
Nolan & Akiyama, supra note 53, at 114.
Boyd et al., supra note 53, at 826.
Id. at 827.
235 Combating Hate Crimes: Promoting a Responsive and Responsible Role for the Federal
Government: Hearing on S. 622 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 44 (1999)
(statement of Burt Neuborne) (acknowledging that inadequate local  resources  can  “make  it  difficult, if
not impossible, to deploy the substantial resources needed to investigate, arrest and prosecute a serious
hate  crime.”).
236 Boyd et al., supra note 53, at 839:
On several occasions, the detective expressed reluctance to file cases with the city attorney
(CA)   or   the   district   attorney   (DA)   unless   the   case   was   ”a   good   one.” . . . [T]he detective
indicated   that   he   considered   filing   ambiguous   or   questionable   cases   a   “waste   of   time”  
because   of   the   CA/DA’s   orientation   to   them.      Thus,   his   emphasis   on   the   more   “visible”  
characteristics of motive may reflect his desire to file only cases which he believes stand a
chance of success in the courts.
See also Nolan & Akiyama, supra note 53, at  114  (“[S]ome  law  enforcement  agencies  have  attributed  
their lack of participation [in federal hate crime data collection efforts] to insufficient  resources.”).
237 Franklin, supra note 54, at 156.
238 Boyd et al., supra note 53, at   831   (“[A]   hate   crime,   by   virtue   of   its   definition . . . places
additional   interpretive   “burdens”   on   the   investigating   detective:   Its   special definitional character,
centered on the motive of the perpetrator, seemingly requires the detective to assume an active role in
determining  the  perpetrator’s  motive  for  acting.”).
239 Susan  E.  Martin,  “A Cross-Burning  is  Not  Just  An  Arson”:  Police  Social  Construction  of  Hate  
Crimes in Baltimore County.”  33  CRIMINOLOGY 303, 320 (1995).
240 Franklin, supra note 54, at 155 (positing that local politics is one factor that influences local
law  enforcement’s  decision  to  categorize    bias  crimes);;   id. at  156  (positing  that  “public opposition to
hate  crime  policies”  is  one  factor  which  influences  the  local  implementation  of  hate  crime  laws); Nolan
& Akiyama, supra note 53, at 115 (noting that the factors that encourage participation in local law
enforcement bias crime reporting include social forces within the local law enforcement organization—
resources, policies, and organizational culture—and forces outside the organization including the
232
233
234
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against bias crime laws can influence witnesses of bias crimes to refuse to
come forward.241 Moreover, public opposition can influence police officers
not to investigate the case as thoroughly, or can entirely prevent officers
from investigating incidents as bias crime cases.
Police officers’ personal skepticism, discrimination, resource
constraints, and public opposition to bias crime laws has especially affected
state and local enforcement agencies’ treatments of crimes motivated by
sexual orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability. Lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) bias crime victims often avoid reporting
their crimes to the police in fear of secondary victimization by homophobic
officers.242 Some LGBT victims are able to obtain additional support from
LGBT nonprofit organizations to help them interact with police personnel
though the investigation process.243 However, these organizations provide
limited support and are often located only in urban areas244 that have
reputations for being better culturally equipped to respond sensitively to
anti-LGBT bias crime incidents.
In passing the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), Congress
presented numerous findings supporting that discriminatory stereotypes
against victims of gender-motivated violence affect the investigations of
gender-motivated crimes.245 Congress noted that police may refuse to take
reports, and even if reports are filed, only 40 percent of those cases will
result in an arrest.246 Moreover, police officers often question victims’
credibility. The police officers may require women to
have physical injuries; to tell a consistent story; to be willing to take a lie
detector test, to not have waited for more than 48 hours before reporting the
incident, to not have engaged in premarital or extramarital sex, to have had no

political climate, local laws, or social norms.
241 Sherry, supra note 221:
Community resistance may mean that witnesses are not prepared to provide supportive
evidence and the case cannot be substantiated. The literature on racist and anti-gay hate
crimes is replete with examples of community resistance to police investigations. . .
Where communities support the victimization process, witnesses can refuse to come
forward and can sabotage the investigative process.
242 See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
243 For example, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, the main LGBT legal advocacy
organization in New England, has a legal infoline that provides legal assistance to victims of anti-LGBT
violence or harassment.    Gay  &  Lesbian  Advocates  &  Defenders,  Glad’s  Legal  Infoline- How Can We
Help?, http://www.glad.org/infoline (last visited Sept. 2, 2008).
244 For  example,  the  Los  Angeles  Gay  &  Lesbian  Center’s  Anti-Violence project provides support
to LGBT bias crime victims to report a bias crime or obtain victim assistance. L.A. Gay & Lesbian
Center, Services and Programs, Hate Crime Victim Assistance, http://www.lagaycenter.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=Anti_Violence_Project (last visited Sept. 2, 2008). Other examples of urban
anti-violence projects include the New York City Gay & Lesbian Anti-Violence Project,
http://www.avp.org/avpmenu.htm   (last   visited   Sept.   2,   2008)   and   Chicago’s   Anti-Violence Project,
http://www.centeronhalsted.org/prog_av.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2008).
245 See generally S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 44–47 (1993).
246 Id. at 42.
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previous social contact with her assailant, and not to have reached the location of
the rape voluntarily.247

If the officers find the victims to be incredible, their crimes will not be
investigated or reported as bias crimes.
Although more research needs to be performed, it is also possible that
police officers are not categorizing gender-motivated bias crimes as bias
crimes given the relatively new status of gender as a protected category in
bias crime law. Studies show that prosecutors are insufficiently informed
about gender bias crimes and often attribute violence against women to
motivations other than bias.248 If these perceptions are held by prosecutors,
then it is highly probable that they are also held by enforcement officers
who investigate bias crimes.
Unique difficulties also arise during the investigations of disability
bias crimes. Many police officers underreport and fail to investigate
disability bias crimes because they believe that people with disabilities are
attacked because of vulnerability, which these officers view as different
from bias. Many police officers also lack special training to interact
sensitively and adequately with disability bias crime victims.249 Moreover,
the communicative and cognitive difficulties of many disability bias crime
victims have perpetuated the unfounded assumption among enforcement
agencies that disability bias crime victims are categorically incompetent
witnesses.250 Finally, inconsistent definitions of “disability” may also
affect whether police officers classify and report crimes to prosecutors as
disability bias crimes. 251
The Matthew Shepard Act can substantially eliminate state and local
failures to classify and to investigate bias crimes because of resource
constraints. Currently, the federal government is authorized to become
involved in the investigation of bias crimes only if the victims were
engaged in federally protected activities when the crimes occurred.252 The
Matthew Shepard Act changes this requirement and permits the federal
government to provide financial and personnel assistance to state and local
Id. at 45–46.
McPhail & DiNitto, supra note 55, at 1162.
Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, Examining the Boundaries of Hate Crime Law: Disabilities
and  the  “Dilemma  of  Difference,” 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 653,  678  (2001)  (“[P]olice  training  
publications and curriculum at federal, state, and local level tend to discuss disability-based hate crime
only infrequently, if at all. . . . [D]isability-based hate crime remains largely invisible to front-line law
enforcers, who tend to focus mostly on race, religion, sexual orientation, and nationality.”);;   Sherry,  
supra note 221 (“Not   all   impairments   are   visible,   and   the   officers   investigating   an  incidents   may   not  
have high levels of disability awareness, so they may not be able to recognise [sic] certain invisible
impairments and may not fully investigate some possible cases of disability discrimination.”); Sorensen,
supra note 220, at 5.
250 Sorensen, supra note 220, at 5.
251 Sherry, supra note 221 (acknowledging  that  “because  of  the  fact  that  there  is  no  consistency  in  
the definitions of disability used, the reporting of disability may be inconsistent.”).
252 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000).
For a list of the six federally protected activities see text
accompanying supra note 5.
247
248
249
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authorities regardless of whether the victim was engaged in a federally
protected activity.253 The Act also allows for the federal government to
become involved in bias crime investigations if state or local authorities
consent or seek the federal government’s aid to investigate bias crimes
because of resource constraints.254 Finally, the Act authorizes the
allocation of funds to award grants to state and local governments to
institute programs designed to combat bias crimes, including programs
designed to train officers in identifying, investigating, and preventing bias
crimes.255
It is less clear whether the Matthew Shepard Act will have a
substantial affect on state and local officers’ personal skepticism towards
bias crimes. But the Act is a step in the right direction. By allocating
funds and personnel to help train state and local authorities to identify,
investigate, and prevent bias crimes,256 the Act may counteract officers’
misconceptions and complete ignorance of bias crimes and their effects.
Moreover, the Act’s provision permitting the federal government to
become involved if state and local charges clearly fail to satisfy the federal
government’s interest in eradicating bias-motivated violence makes it
possible for bias crime victims to obtain legal compensation despite local
and state authorities’ personal biases.257
3. Failure to Prosecute Bias Crimes
Even when victims report bias crimes, and enforcement officers
investigate and refer the crimes to prosecutors, many prosecutors decide
not to prosecute them as bias crimes. One reason influencing prosecutors’
decisions is the high evidentiary burden to prove a bias motive.258
Evidentiary ambiguities also prevent prosecutors from prosecuting crimes
as bias crimes. For instance, if the only evidence to prove bias motive is a
racist, homophobic, or sexist epithet, then the prosecutor may conclude or
believe that a jury or judge will conclude that the incident was motivated
by reasons other than bias towards the victim because of race, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or gender.259 Evidentiary ambiguities and the
high burden to prove a bias motive especially deter prosecutors from
prosecuting bias crimes given the pressure imposed upon them to lighten
their heavy case loads.260 Although more research needs to be done, some
253 Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. § 4(a)
(2007); Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act, S. 1105, 110th Cong. §
4(a) (2007).
254 H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. 249(b)(2)(B)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
255 H.R. 1592, § 4(a); S. 1105, § 5(a).
256 See H.R. 1592, § 4(a); S. 1105, § 5(a).
257 H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(2)(D); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
258 Franklin, supra note 54,  at  157  (“One  of  the  major  constraints  faced  by  district attorneys . . .is
the inherent difficulty in proving hatred or bias as a primary motivation.”).
259 Id.
260 Boyd et al., supra note 53, at 839:
On several occasions, the detective expressed reluctance to file cases with the city attorney
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researchers have found that prosecutors’ personal skepticism towards bias
crime laws may also influence their decisions not to prosecute bias
crimes.261
To date, no study has comprehensively addressed the factors that
influence prosecutors not to charge crimes motivated by sexual orientation
or gender identity as bias crimes in the United States. More research needs
to be performed on this issue. In passing the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), however, Congress presented significant findings supporting the
idea that prosecutors’ victim-blaming attitudes and credibility doubts often
result in the inadequate prosecution of gender-motivated bias crimes.262
Congress also noted that “[j]udges and juries expect more corroboration in
sexual assault cases than in other cases of a similar class even when there is
no such legal requirement.”263 This high burden may deter prosecutors
from prosecuting a crime as a gender-motivated bias crime. Finally,
studies indicate that prosecutors are insufficiently informed about gendermotivated bias crimes and often attribute violence against women to
motivations of power and control rather than bias.264 These misconceptions
affect whether prosecutors view gender-motivated crimes as bias crimes.
Disability bias crime prosecutions are disproportionately low. Even
though an average of approximately seventy-three disability bias crimes
were reported to the FBI from 2004 through 2006,265 only one case in
history has successfully been tried as a disability bias crime.266 Possible
explanations for this disparity include prosecutors’ views that disability
bias crime victims are targeted because of their vulnerability and not
because of bias.267 Moreover, unwarranted assumptions that disability bias

(CA)   or   the   district   attorney   (DA)   unless   the   case   was   “a   good   one.” . . . [T]he detective
indicated   that   he   considered   filing   ambiguous   or   questionable   cases   a   “waste   of   time”  
because   of   the   CA/DAs’   orientation   to   them.      Thus,   his   emphasis   on   the   more   “visible”  
characteristics of motive may reflect his desire to file only cases which he believes stand a
chance of success in the courts. Id.
261 For an example of how personal perspectives influence   prosecutors’   decisions   to   prosecute
gender-motivated crimes as bias crimes, see generally McPhail & DiNitto, supra note 55.
262 S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 44–47 (1993).
263 Id. at 45.
264 McPhail & DiNitto, supra note 55, at 1172.
265 In 2004, seventy-one disability bias crimes were reported to the FBI. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: HATE CRIME STATISTICS 2004, http://www.fbi.gov/
ucr/hc2004/section1.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2008). In 2005, fifty-three disability bias crimes were
reported to the FBI. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: HATE CRIME
STATISTICS 2005, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2005/incidentsoffenses.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2008). In
2006, ninety-four disability bias crimes were reported to the FBI. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION: HATE CRIME STATISTICS 2006, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2006/incidents.html (last
visited Aug. 20, 2008).
266 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
267 Sherry, supra note 221, at 15 (citing that one   of   the   reasons   that   influences   prosecutors’  
decisions not to prosecute disability bias crimes as bias crimes is the mislabeling of disability bias
crimes as abuse).
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crime victims are categorically incompetent witnesses may also affect
prosecutors’ decision to prosecute disability bias crimes.268
Although the Matthew Shepard Act will not eliminate state and local
prosecutorial biases, it is a substantial improvement from the status quo.
First, the Act provides for a grant program to train state and local officials
to prosecute bias crimes.269 The Act also permits states and local
prosecutors to seek or consent to the federal government’s prosecutorial
assistance when burdened by resource constraints.270 Moreover, the Act’s
provision permitting the federal government to become involved if state
and local charges clearly do not satisfy the Federal interest in eradicating
bias-motivated violence makes it possible for bias crime victims to obtain
legal compensation in extreme cases, despite state and local prosecutors’
personal biases.271
B.

The Limited Scope of the Matthew Shepard Act

To be considered valid Section 5 legislation, Morrison affirms that a
federal law must not be too sweeping in scope, even if congressional
findings establish an existing of a pattern of constitutional rights
violations.272 Part IV.B.2 presented three factors that the Court balances to
evaluate whether a law is too sweeping.273 First, the Court evaluates the
extent to which the law is limited to situations involving unconstitutional
behavior. Second, the Court evaluates whether state remedies are adequate
and present throughout the States. Third, the Court evaluates whether the
law targets the actions of states or private actors. These factors guide the
following analysis, which establishes that the Matthew Shepard Act is not
too sweeping and is thus a valid piece of Section 5 legislation.
1. The Matthew Shepard Act’s Limited Focus on Unconstitutional
Behavior
Unlike the sweeping laws at issue in Florida Prepaid and Morrison,
the Matthew Shepard Act focuses on addressing resource limitations and
discriminatory biases that unjustly prevent bias crime victims targeted
because of sexual orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability from
having access to the courts.274 Section 4 of the Act allows the federal
government to aid state and local governments in investigating and
prosecuting bias crimes when local and state governments specifically
Sorensen, supra note 220, at 5.
Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. § 3(b)
(2007); Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, S. 1105, 110th
Cong. § 4(b) (2007).
270 H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(2)(B)–(C)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
271 H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 249(b)(2)(D)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
272 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
273 See discussion supra Part V.B.2.
274 The textual citations in this section  refer  to  the  Senate’s  version  of  the  Matthew  Shepard  Act,  
and  are  accompanied  by  a  parallel  citation  to  the  House’s  version  of  the  Act.
268
269
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request assistance.275 Section 4 also allocates federal funds for state and
local governments to compensate for the extraordinary expenses associated
with the investigation and prosecution of bias crimes.276 Moreover, Section
6 authorizes the federal government to grant additional personnel to assist
state and local governments to investigate and to prosecute bias crimes.277
Because these provisions merely provide assistance when requested by
state and local governments, they do not substantively change state or local
law guarantees and are thus not invalid under the Supreme Court’s current
Section 5 framework.
Section 249 of the Matthew Shepard Act is more constitutionally
suspect. This section expands the protected characteristics of federal bias
crime legislation to include sexual orientation, gender identity, gender, and
disability.278 Section 249 also amends 18 U.S.C. section 245 by allowing
the federal government to become involved in bias crime investigations and
prosecutions even if the victims are not engaged in federally protected
activities at the time of the incidents.279
Congressional representatives opposing the Matthew Shepard Act
argue that the bill does not adequately target unconstitutional behavior
because it “open[s] the door to criminal investigations of an offender’s
thoughts and beliefs about his or her victims.”280 These dissenting
statements are rooted in the belief that punishing bias crimes is inconsistent
with First Amendment principles. This view ignores the Court’s holding in
Wisconsin v. Mitchell,281 which affirmed that bias crime penaltyenhancement statutes are consistent with the First Amendment because
these statutes target conduct and not expression.282
Congressional representatives also argue that the Matthew Shepard
Act “raises significant federalism concerns”283 because the law
“criminalizes acts that have long been regulated primarily by the states.”284
More specifically, they posit that the Act is too sweeping because it opens
the floodgates to allow the federal government to become involved in all
bias crime investigations and prosecutions. These federalism concerns are
also invalid. Section 249(b) contains a “certification requirement” that
substantially limits the scope of cases that the federal government is
permitted to investigate or to prosecute.285 Before the federal government

H.R. 1592, § 3; S. 1105, § 4.
H.R. 1592, § 3; S. 1105, § 4.
H.R. 1592, § 5; S. 1105, § 6.
278 H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
279 H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
280 H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 39 (2007).
281 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
282 Id.   at   484   (“a physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct
protected  by  the  First  Amendment.”).
283 H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 41 (2007).
284 Id.
285 H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)), S. 1105, § 7 (same).
275
276
277
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may become involved, it must have “reasonable cause to believe that the
actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person was a motivating
factor underlying the alleged conduct of the defendant.”286 A certified
individual from the federal government must then consult with a state or
local law enforcement official to determine whether the federal
government’s involvement is warranted.287 The federal government may
only become involved if (1) “the State does not have jurisdiction or does
not intend to exercise jurisdiction;” (2) “the State has requested that the
Federal Government assume jurisdiction;” (3) “the State does not object to
the Federal Government assuming jurisdiction;” or (4) “the verdict or
sentence obtained pursuant to State charges” did not sufficiently address
the federal interest in preventing bias-motivated violence.288
These four criteria are narrowly tailored to the scenarios where bias
crime victims would be deprived of their right of access to the courts if the
federal government was unable to become involved in bias crime
investigations and prosecutions. In fact, upon passing the Matthew
Shepard Act, the House of Representatives explicitly conceded that “[s]tate
and local authorities currently investigate and prosecute the overwhelming
majority of [bias] crimes and will continue to do so under this
legislation.”289 Like the legislation narrowly targeted “at the faultline
between work and family” in Hibbs,290 the Matthew Shepard Act should
not be deemed as too sweeping for targeting constitutional behavior.
2. The Inadequacy of State Bias Crime Laws
In Kimel291 and Garrett,292 the Court held that the enacted federal laws
were too sweeping because state remedies were adequate and present
throughout the states to address state unconstitutional behavior.
Conversely, in Hibbs,293 the Court held that the inadequacy and lack of
state remedies supported the notion that federal law was necessary, and
thus not overly sweeping.
Virtually every state has some form of bias crime law.294 Critics of
the Matthew Shepard Act have highlighted that the existence of state bias
laws renders the bill unnecessary. For instance, Congressional dissenters
of the Act noted that “[h]ate-crime laws are unnecessary: [T]he underlying
offense is already fully and aggressively prosecuted in almost all
H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(1)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(2)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)(2)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 7 (2007).
Nev.  Dep’t  Human  Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738–39 (2003). This is the precise area where
state  unconstitutional  behavior  “has  been  and  remains  [the]  strongest.”    Id. at 738.
291 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
292 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
293 Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
294 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
286
287
288
289
290
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[s]tates.”295 The dissenters further contended that there was “zero evidence
that States are not fully prosecuting violent crimes involving hate.”296 In
light of the Court’s current Section 5 framework, critics could posit that the
existence of state bias crime laws in all states supports that the Matthew
Shepard Act is too sweeping.
However, these dissenters focus on the overall number of state bias
crime laws without considering the differences in the groups that are
afforded protection under these laws. The Matthew Shepard Act
specifically amends and expands federal bias crime law to include sexual
orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability. Many states do not
include these characteristics in their bias crime laws.297 Consequently,
many bias crime victims who are targeted on the basis of sexual
orientation, gender identity, gender, or disability cannot receive
compensation, nor can their perpetrators be punished for committing bias
crimes. Therefore, the inadequacy of state laws to protect against bias
crimes motivated specifically by sexual orientation, gender identity,
gender, and disability demonstrates that the Matthew Shepard Act is
necessary and not overly sweeping.
3. The Matthew Shepard Act’s Focus on State Action
In Morrison, the Court invalidated the civil remedy provision of the
VAWA because it targeted the behavior of private rather than state
actors.298 Given that the Matthew Shepard Act provides for the increased
punishment of bias crime perpetrators, and does not exclusively punish
states and localities for failing to investigate and prosecute bias crimes,
legislative opponents of the Matthew Shepard Act contend that the Act is
an invalid exercise of Congress’ Section 5 enforcement power.299
However, unlike the civil remedy of VAWA, Sections 4 through 6 of
the Matthew Shepard Act focus on assisting states and localities to
investigate and prosecute bias crimes only when they seek the federal
government’s assistance.300 The purpose of these provisions is to aid states
and localities, not to punish private behavior. Therefore, these provisions
are not invalid under Morrison for targeting private behavior.
The only portion of the Matthew Shepard Act that is constitutionally
suspect for targeting private behavior is Section 249, which expands the
H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 45 (2007).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
297 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
298 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000).
299 The Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. § 6
(2007)   (proposing   changes   to   18   U.S.C.   §   249(a)(2))   (dissenting   views)   (“The   14th amendment
prohibits the States from denying equal protection of the law, due process or the privileges and
immunities of U.S. citizenship…[The  Fourteenth  Amendment]  extends  only  to  state  action  and  do[es]  
not encompass the actions of private persons. Hate Crimes by private persons are outside the scope of
these  amendments.”).
300 H.R. 1592, § 3–5; S. 1105, § 3–5.
295
296
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federal government’s authority to become involved in investigating and
prosecuting bias crimes motivated by sexual orientation, gender identity,
gender, or disability regardless of whether the victims were engaged in a
federally protected activity at the time of the crime. 301 Section 249
specifically punishes individuals for committing bias crimes, not state and
local authorities for failing to investigate or to prosecute bias crimes.302
Therefore, bias crime law proponents may have difficulty establishing that
Section 249 does not impermissibly target private behavior.
However, a close reading of Morrison highlights an important
distinction between Section 249 and VAWA’s civil remedy. In Morrison,
Congress did not limit the civil provision’s application to areas of behavior
or localities where state unconstitutional behavior was at issue.303 The
provision allowed the federal government to become involved regardless of
whether a particular state was adequately punishing gender-motivated
violence.304 The Court infered from the broad scope of the provision that
“it [was] directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have
committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias.”305
In contrast, the Matthew Shepard Act’s proposed changes to the
punishments in Section 249(a) can only be imposed when the “certification
requirement” of Section 249(b) is met.306 In its congressional findings, the
House of Representatives stated explicitly that the Matthew Shepard Act
should only be applied “[i]n limited circumstances . . . for example, where
the State does not have an appropriate statute, or otherwise declines to
investigate or prosecute; where the State requests that the Federal
Government assume jurisdiction; or where actions by State and local law
enforcement officials leave demonstratively unvindicated the Federal
interest in eradicating bias-motivated violence.”307 Therefore, when
Sections 249(a) and (b) are read in conjunction, the expanded punishments
in Section 249(a) should not be interpreted as targeting the criminal acts of
private individuals. Rather, these punishments target the unconstitutional
behaviors of states and localities that prevent bias crime victims from
having equal access to the courts.
CONCLUSION
Congressional Democrats’ recent move to drop the Matthew Shepard
Act from the Department of Defense authorization bill was unfortunate.
But with Democrats now in control of Congress and the election of
President Barack Obama, there is renewed hope that the Matthew Shepard
301
302
303
304
305
306
307

H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C § 249); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C § 249); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626–27 (2000).
Id.
Id. at 626.
H.R. 1592, § 6 (proposing changes to 18 U.S.C. § 249(b)); S. 1105, § 7 (same).
H.R. REP. NO. 110-113, at 7 (2007).

WOODS

2008]

3/23/2009 7:14 PM

A Section 5 Defense of the Matthew Shepard Act

431

Act will be enacted during the next four years. The enactment of the
Matthew Shepard Act will be a historic point in the bias crime law
movement, but this important piece of legislation will not go unchallenged.
The Matthew Shepard Act’s previous congressional defeat gives
Congress a new opportunity to explore and to put forth alternative
constitutional justifications for the Act when it is introduced in a
subsequent session. Congress must take advantage of this opportunity in
order to prevent the Matthew Shepard Act from being defeated legally. In
this Article, I have advocated that one alternative constitutional
justification for the Matthew Shepard Act is Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Bias crime victims who are targeted on the basis of sexual
orientation, gender identity, gender, and disability face unique difficulties
in law enforcement and judicial systems that prevent them from having
access to the courts. Congress recognized similar difficulties for victims of
gender-motivated violence when it exercised its Section 5 enforcement
power to enact VAWA’s federal civil remedy, and the Supreme Court has
recognized that ensuring equal access to the courts is a legitimate goal of
Section 5 legislation. Therefore, in addition to its commerce power, I urge
Congress to expand its current constitutional justification for the Matthew
Shepard Act by invoking its Section 5 enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment.

